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December 8, 1999
To the Auditing Standards Boards:
Enclosed are copies of the comment letters received to date on the Proposed Statement on 
Auditing Standards, Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61, 
Communication with Audit Committees, and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71, 
Interim Financial Information.
To aide in your review, a summary of the comment letters by topic is also enclosed.
Please call me at 212/596-6026 if you have any questions.
Sincerely,
Kim Gibson
Technical Manager 
Audit and Attest Standards
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036-8775 (212) 596-6200 • fax (212) 596-6213
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Letter_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
4,16,18,26 
Support the proposed am
endm
ent to SA
S N
o. 61_________________________________________________________
2,5,7,13,17,21, 
The requirem
ent for the auditor to discuss the quality, not just the acceptability of
 the entity's accounting principles
25,27 
should be rem
oved.__________________________
_____________________________________________________
"25 
Term
s such as “clarity”, “neutrality” and “representational faithfulness” be deleted because they do not have a
recognized objective m
eaning_______________________________________________________________________
3,15,23 
• 
The exclusive use of
 the term
s taken from
 Concepts N
o. 2 m
ay lose the flavor of
 the intention of
 the Panel and the
BRC.
• 
The discussion of "conservatism
" in paragraph 96 of
 Concepts N
o. 2 is useful in this regard
• 
W
e believe this discussion of "conservatism
" offers an opportunity to link the w
ords in there com
m
endations of
 the 
BRC and the 1994 Panel w
ith the accounting literature.
W
e believe that these term
s, (aggressiveness or conservatism
 ) w
hile not easily defined, are relatively easily 
understood in financial circles and can serve as a useful benchm
ark for audit com
m
ittee m
em
bers. W
e w
ould not 
object to the inclusion of
 these concepts in the final standard.
W
e recom
m
end that the w
ording in the am
endm
ents to SA
S 61 revert to the “aggressive or conservative”, w
ording, 
recom
m
ended by the Blue Ribbon Com
m
ittee.__________________________________________________________
1,3,5,12,15,19, 
The requirem
ent prohibiting the com
m
unication of
 the auditor's judgm
ents in w
riting should be rem
oved
21,22,24,29_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
29 
The proposal does not distinguish quality from
 preferability. The A
SB should ass a footnote explaining that quality
does not carry the sam
e m
eaning as preferability as the latter is used in A
PB N
o. 20.
 3 
The standard should clearly state that the auditor has a responsibility to com
m
unicate to the audit com
m
ittee his/her
qualitative assessm
ents of
 the com
pany's financial reporting w
hether or not m
anagem
ent chooses to play an active role 
in the discussion.__________________________________________________________________________________
11 
D
iscussions w
ith non-SEC clients concerning the auditor’s judgem
ents about the quality of
 the entity’s accounting
principles w
ould also be beneficial.___________________________________________________________________
1
2 
The Exposure D
raft assum
es that m
anagem
ent w
ould be included as a participant. W
e do not believe that such
assum
ption should be included in the language of
 the am
endm
ent.___________________________________________
 29 
Clarify that auditors are not precluded from
 having this discussion privately w
ith the audit com
m
ittee._______________
15, 
W
e are concerned that the technical language used to describe the substance of
 the discussion (particularly the
references to representational faithfulness, verifiability, neutrality and consistency) m
ay not be understandable to m
any 
practitioners, and certainly not understandable to m
ost audit com
m
ittee m
em
bers, w
ho m
ay look to this language to 
help them
 fram
e their discussion w
ith their auditors.______________________________________________________
20 
D
ata in our study provide no evidence that discussions betw
een the auditor and the audit com
m
ittee about the quality
and appropriateness of earnings w
ill m
itigate against aggressive reporting_____________________________________
"23 
W
e recom
m
end the com
m
unication of
 the "quality, not just the acceptability, of
 the com
pany's accounting principles"
be integrated w
ith the existing com
m
unication requirem
ents regarding accounting policies and estim
ates rather than 
added as a new
 item
 in the list_______________________________________________________________________
 23 
The discussion contem
plated by the am
endm
ents to SA
S 61 w
ould be appropriate as part of
 the annual com
m
unication
w
ith the audit com
m
ittee of
 m
atters related to the conduct of
 the audit, but w
e do not believe it w
ould be appropriate as 
part of
 a discussion resulting from
 a quarterly review
._____________________________________________________
 29 
A sentence should be added instructing the auditor to carefully review
 any m
inutes or other w
ritings resulting from
 the
m
eeting prepared by the audit com
m
ittee or m
anagem
ent to ensure that the w
ritings are consistent w
ith the auditors' 
understanding of
 w
hat w
as com
m
unicated._____________________________________________________________
29 
A
U
 380 requires discussion w
ith audit com
m
ittees concerning the selection of
 accounting policies, estim
ates and
judgem
ents. It is unclear w
hether the A
SB had som
ething different in m
ind by repeating these aspects of
 the required 
com
m
unication.
29 
The proposal discussed the consistency of
 the entity's accounting inform
ation contained in the financial statem
ents
tw
ice.___________________________________________________________________________________________
SA
S N
o. 71, Interim
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C
om
m
ent 
C
om
m
ent
Letter 
________________________________________________________________________________________________
3,7,18 
Supports proposed revisions_________________________________________________________________________
2,4,8,9,13 
Tim
e restrictive requirem
ent. M
ore restrictive for a review
 than is currently required w
ith a G
A
A
S audit.
Tim
e schedules and deadlines m
ake this recom
m
endation im
practical to im
plem
ent and could result in needless delays 
in the financial reporting process.
Such discussions should not be required prior to the filing of
 Form 10-Q, or prior to public announcem
ent of
 interim
 
financial inform
ation______________________________________________________________________________
5,10,15,16,25, 
D
iscussions prior to public announcem
ent should not be required.
26,28__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
11 
H
e or she should attem
pt to m
ake such com
m
unications w
ith the audit com
m
ittee...” U
se of
 the w
ord “attem
pt,”
w
ithout providing guidance as to w
hat w
ould satisfy an “attem
pt”, appears to w
eaken this am
endm
ent and m
ake 
determ
inations of
 com
pliance difficult.
""12 
The w
ord "attem
pt" m
ay place too m
uch of
 a burden upon the auditor particularly w
hen the tinting of
 the release of
 the
inform
ation m
ay be affected. A
ccordingly, w
e suggest that the auditor's role under these circum
stances should be 
lim
ited to an offer or indication of
 availability to m
ake such com
m
unication
13,14,17 
Such discussion should take place w
hen m
atters of significance arise, but should not be required in the absence of
 such
m
atters._________________________________________________________________________________________
2 
If an entity has an audit com
m
ittee, the potential com
m
unication should apply, w
hether public or private com
pany.
5 
.. .there should be no im
plication that all publicly traded com
panies should be subject to quarterly review
s of interim
financial statem
ents, regardless of size, industry or state of
 development.______________________________________
5,21,25 
.. .deletion of
 the requirem
ent to discuss the "quality" of
 accounting principles_________________________________
 20 
O
ur study indicates that earlier auditor involvem
ent in a client firm
's decisions about accounting m
ethods likely w
ill
m
itigate against aggressive financial reporting. Specifically, w
e find that experienced auditors are less likely to deem
 a 
client’s aggressive accounting m
ethod to be acceptable w
hen the auditor is involved in m
anagem
ent's decision m
aking
before, rather than after, quarterly statem
ents have been released to the public and filed w
ith the SEC._______________
 21 
 
It is unclear w
hether the m
atters to be com
m
unicated pursuant to the revised paragraph 25 w
ould include the “quality”
of an entity’s accounting principles as contem
plated by the proposed revisions to SA
S N
o. 61. Consequently, TIC 
recom
m
ends that this issue be clarified.________________________________________________________________
 23 
A
m
endm
ents to SA
S 71, as they relate to the im
portance of
 the tim
ing of
 the discussion betw
een the auditor and the
audit com
m
ittee, revert to the stated approach recom
m
ended by the Blue Ribbon Com
m
ittee, that is that the m
atter be 
discussed "...prior to the filing of
 the Form 10-Q (and preferably prior to any public announcem
ent of
 financial 
results)..."____________________________________________
”24 
Situations m
ay arise w
herein the audit com
m
ittee m
ay believe it unnecessary to have discussions w
ith the accountant
upon com
pletion of
 the review
. In those circum
stances, w
e believe the accountant should cover those m
atters w
hen 
m
aking the com
m
unications specified by paragraph 6 through 16 of A
U Section 380 (as am
ended) incidental to the 
annual audit. W
e recom
m
end the addition to the proposed standard of
 guidance to that effect._____________________
 24 
Clarification is needed w
ith respect to the specific m
atters described in A
U Section 380 that should be com
m
unicated
to the audit com
m
ittee arising out of
 a review
 of
 interim
 inform
ation. Certain of
 the m
atters discussed in A
U Section 
380, such as the auditors
’ responsibility under G
A
A
S and difficulties encountered in perform
ing the audit are not 
applicable to review
s of
 quarterly inform
ation. In addition, the accountant’s responsibility for other inform
ation in 
docum
ents containing interim
 inform
ation is addressed in A
U Sections 722.33 and 550. A
ccordingly, w
e recom
m
end 
that the proposed standard state that, to the extent applicable, the m
atters described in paragraphs 7 through 10,13 and 
14 of SA
S N
o. 61 (as am
ended and renum
bered by SA
S N
o. 89 and Part 1 of
 this proposed standard) should be 
com
m
unicated to the audit com
m
ittee as a result of
 the accountant having perform
ed a review
 of
 interim
 financial 
inform
ation______________________________________________________________________________________
24 
Explicitly acknow
ledge, as A
U Section 380 does, that the com
m
unication m
ay be w
ritten or oral, and if
 oral, that the
accountant docum
ent the m
atters discussed by m
em
orandum
 or other notation in the w
orking papers._______________
”24 
The proposed standard should be issued only after analysis of
 the additional effects on A
U Section 722, if any, of
 the
SEC
’s final requirem
ents for tim
ely review
 of
 interim
 financial inform
ation.___________________________________
 24 
The effective date for this part of
 the proposed standard be for interim
 periods in fiscal years beginning on or after June
15, 2000. H
ow
ever, w
e w
ould not object to perm
itting earlier application, including m
id-year adoption during 
calendar year 2000.________________________________________________________________________________
”25 
w
e recom
m
end that the proposed effectiveness of
 the new
 requirem
ents be extended one year_____________________
29 
Require this com
m
unication w
ith the audit com
m
ittees prior to the filing of
 the annual financial statem
ents and prior to
the public release of
 the annual results.
AICPA
December 9, 1999
File Ref. Nos. 1120
2280
To the Auditing Standards Board:
Here are the comment letters received to date on the proposed Statement on Auditing 
Standards, Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61, Communication 
with Audit Committees, and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71, Interim Financial 
Information.
Name/Affiliation Location
1. Peter H. Burgher Howell, MI
2. Greg Swalwell Dallas, TX
3. Charles A. Bowsher, Chairman
Public Oversight Board Stamford, CT
4. Michael L. Conley
McDonald’s
Oak Brook, IL
5. Richard H. Troy
Cell Pathways, Inc. Horsham, PA
6. Kevin Wilson Tivoli, NY
7. Mark Wovsaniker
America Online Incorporated Dulles, VA
8. Jay R. Lundborg
First Midwest Itasca, IL
9. Paul Jones
American Home Products Corporation Madison, NJ
10. Andy Bryant
Intel Corporation Santa Clara, CA
11. William G. Bishop III, CIA
Institute of Internal Auditors Altamonte Springs, FL
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036-8775 • (212) 596-6200 • fax (212) 596-6213 • www.aicpa.org 
ISO9001 Certified
Name/Affiliation Location
12. Richard Rowe
American Bar Association Chicago, IL
13. Mr. R. L. Polark
Walgreens Deerfield, IL
14. Scott A. Scherff
The Timken Company Canton, OH
15. PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP Florham Park, NJ
16. Donald D. Humphreys
Exxon Corporation Irving, TX
17. Steven E. Howarth
Black & Decker Corporation Towson, MD
18. Dr. Douglas E. Ziegenfuss
Virginia Society 
of Certified Public Accountants Virginia Beach, VA
19. Lawrence P. Brown Chicago, IL
20. Kathryn Kadous
University of Washington Seattle, WA
21. Candace Wright
PCPS Technical Issues Committee Baton Rouge, LA
22. Vincent Love
New York State Society 
of Certified Public Accountants New York, NY
23 Ernst & Young LLP Cleveland, OH
24 Deloitte & Touche LLP Wilton, CT
25. Guy Lander
New York State Bar Association Albany, NY
26. Donald E. Kiernan
SBC Communications Inc. San Antonio, TX
2
Name/Affiliation
27. Joy L. Gibson, CPA 
Florida Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants
28. M. R. Kitten 
Chevron Corporation
29 Arthur Andersen
OTHERS
Name/Affiliation
1. Meritor Automotive, Inc. 
Thomas Madden
2. Charles H. Harff 
Meritor Automotive, Inc.
3. Richard E. Staedtler 
Castle Energy Corporation
Location
Tallahassee, FL
San Francisco, CA
Chicago, IL
Location
Troy, MI
Troy, MI
Radnor, PA
If you have any questions, please call me at 212/596-6026. 
Sincerely,
Kim Gibson
Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards
Enclosures
cc: Audit Committee Effectiveness Task Force
3
PETER H. BURGHER 
2 Brambleberry Dr. 
Howell, Ml 48843
517 546-3799
November 3, 1999
AICPA
Audit and Attest Standards
Attn: Sherry Boothe
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036
Gentlemen:
With reference to proposed amendments to SAS No. 71, Part 1 there must be a 
misprint or some other form of error in the sentence that states (within paragraph 11) “the 
auditors’ judgements shall not be communicated in writing”.
In our society written expression always takes precedence over oral expression, 
witness the severe limitations in the rules governing parol evidence. It would be sheer 
lunacy to require that auditors, whose communications should always be made with 
clarity and precision, to communicate solely by oral means. It is hard to imagine the 
levels of misunderstanding that could be achieved by lay audit committee members when 
confronted with easily forgotten and possibly imprecise discussions by highly technical 
experts attempting to explain broad intangibles and qualitative judgements.
I urge the committee to correct this error at its earliest possible convenience lest 
the entire financial community think the profession has, even temporarily, lost its 
collective mind. Written expression should be required with the license given that 
auditors are encouraged to amplify, interpret and explain their judgements in person by 
discussion and examples.
The subject matter of the proposed revisions is serious business and will be 
difficult to implement. While auditor’s professional activities have always relied upon 
high levels of judgement based on education, training and experience, the explanation of
#1
PETER H. BURGHER
AICPA
Audit and Attest Standards 
Page Two
such highly intangible concepts as judgements concerning “quality” of management’s 
judgements as disclosed by accounting practices, theories and procedures will be difficult 
at best. It would be wise to ensure the communications by auditors are always clearly 
documented and that a record is maintained.
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions.
Sincerely.
Peter H. Burgher, CPA 
AICPA No. 109670
phb:ed
COMMENT LETTER # 2
7915 Xavier Court
Dallas, Texas 75218-4513
November 9, 1999 VTA EMAIL - sboothe@aicpa.org
Sherry Boothe
AICPA Audit and Attest Standards
File 2280
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Boothe:
I am writing to give my comments on the Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards Amendments to 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61 and 71.
SAS No. 61
I object to the proposed amendment to SAS No. 61 to require the auditor to discuss with the audit committee 
the auditor's judgment about the "quality" of an entity's accounting principles as applied in its financial 
reporting.
The Auditing Standards Board correctly acknowledges that no objective criteria have been established to aid 
in the consistent evaluation of the "quality" of an entity's accounting measurements and disclosures. Without 
such objective criteria, any such discussion would be highly subjective and potentially confusing and 
misleading. For example, there is no guidance as to how such a discussion of "quality" relates to the 
auditor's attestation with respect to the fair presentation of an entity's financial statements in accordance with 
GAAP. Does the Auditing Standards Board envision that the auditor will express an opinion to the audit 
committee that the entity's financial statements are presented more or less "fair" than other entities' financial 
statements by reference to a discussion of the undefined term "quality?" Is the Auditing Standards Board 
stating that there are acceptable differences in the degree of the "quality" of a set of GAAP financial 
statements, taken as a whole? Wouldn't shareholders and other users of GAAP financial statements have a 
right to know the auditor's views about these differences in degree of "quality?"
The Auditing Standards Board showed its reservations to the proposed requirement by prohibiting such 
communications to the audit committee from being in writing. If the Auditing Standards Board is so 
uncomfortable with its proposal so as to prohibit such communications to the audit committee from being in 
writing, then such communications should not be required in the first place.
I believe the proposed communication requirement should only be adopted after objective criteria are 
sufficiently established which will allow for consistency in the evaluation of "quality." Accordingly, because 
such criteria do not presently exist, I do not support the proposed amendment to SAS No. 61 at this time.
SAS No. 71
The proposed new section AU 722.26 is confusing with respect to the timing of the potential communication 
to the audit committee if the entity makes a public announcement of its interim financial information prior to 
making a filing with the regulatory agency (e.g. an entity issues a press release announcing its interim results 
before filing its Form 10-Q with the SEC). In that case, the proposed amendment states that the auditor 
should attempt to make such communication prior to the public announcement of the interim financial 
information. For that to occur, the auditor would have to complete their SAS 71 review prior to such public 
announcement, and therefore the proposed AU 722.26 could be construed to contain such a timing 
requirement. This may not always be practical from a timing standpoint.
The ASB correctly acknowledges that the Blue Ribbon Committee's proposal to require the auditor to 
complete a SAS 71 review of the interim financial statements prior to filing with the SEC is a matter to be 
taken up by the SEC. The requirements of when such a review should be performed should also be left up to 
the SEC.
AU 380.04 states that the required communication with the audit committee is incidental to the audit and is 
not required to occur before issuance of the auditor's report on the financial statements. AU 380.04 does 
state that there may be instances where such communication should occur prior to the issuance of the audit 
report, and those instances are left up to the auditor's judgment. I see no logical reason to require a more 
time-restrictive requirement for the timing of the communication to the audit committee following a non­
audit, SAS 71 review, as is currently reflected in the proposed amendment to AU 722, than is currently 
required with a GAAS audit per AU 380.
Also, regardless of whether or not the SAS 71 review is performed on an entity making periodic filings with 
the SEC or other regulatory agency, the potential communication to the audit committee should be required. 
The required communications contained in AU 380 are applicable to SEC registrants and non-SEC 
registrants who have an audit committee or similar functioning body (AU 380.01). Therefore, I see no need 
for a different scope requirement in AU 722. If a review is performed, and the entity has an audit committee 
or similar body, the potential communication should occur.
Accordingly, I recommend that the proposed section AU 722.26 not be adopted, and that AU 722.25 be re­
written in its entirety as follows:
"In performing the procedures in paragraphs .13 through .19, the accountant also should consider whether 
any of the matters described in AU 380, Communications With Audit Committees, as they relate to the 
interim financial information, have been identified. If such matters have been identified, the accountant 
should communicate them to the audit committee or be satisfied, through discussions with the audit 
committee, that such matters have been communicated with the audit committee by management. For 
instance, the accountant should determine that the audit committee is informed about the process used by 
management in formulating particularly sensitive accounting estimates or about a change in a significant 
accounting policy affecting the interim results. Such communication with the audit committee is incidental 
to the performance of the procedures in paragraphs .13 through .19. Accordingly, they are not required to 
occur before issuance of the accountant's review report, as discussed elsewhere in this section, so long as 
they occur on a timely basis. There may be occasions, however, where communication of certain matters 
with the audit committee prior to issuance of the accountant's review report may, in the accountant's 
judgment, be desirable.
Thank you for your consideration to my comments.
Sincerely,
/s/ Greg Swalwell
Greg Swalwell - AICPA Member # 1-01104439
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November 12, 1999
Ms. Sherry Boothe
American Institute of CPAs 
Audit and Attest Standards 
File 2280
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036-8775 
Attn: ITC 99-1
Dear Ms. Boothe:
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards, 
Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61, Communication with Audit 
Committees (“SAS No. 61”), and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71, Interim Financial 
Information (“SAS No. 71 ”), issued by the AICPA Auditing Standards Board on October 1, 
1999.
The Board fully supports the proposed revision of SAS No. 71 concerning communications 
with audit committees relating to review of interim financial information. Therefore, the 
following comments relate to the proposed amendments to SAS No. 61.
As you know, the Public Oversight Board in March 1994 formed a special Panel to inquire 
into matters relating to auditor objectivity and independence. That Panel, which was chaired 
by our current Vice-Chairman, Donald J. Kirk, recommended a number of steps to enhance 
the integrity of financial reporting through strengthening the communication between a 
company’s independent auditor and its board of directors and audit committee. These steps 
were fully embraced by our Board.
Included among the recommendations in the Panel’s report, Strengthening the Professionalism 
of the Independent Auditor, which was issued in September 1994 was a recommendation to 
enhance auditor communication to audit committees of qualitative judgments about 
accounting principles, disclosures and estimates. The Panel encouraged auditors to timely 
communicate with boards and their audit committees about (1) the auditors’ qualitative 
judgments about accounting principles used or proposed by management, not just whether or 
not those principles are acceptable, (2) the degree of aggressiveness or conservatism implied 
in the company’s accounting principles and underlying estimates, and (3) the clarity of 
financial disclosures.
POB
The Public Oversight Board is an independent, private sector body that monitors and 
reports on the self-regulatory programs and activities of the SEC Practice Section of the 
Division for CPA Firms of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
#3
2The Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the 
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees included among its ten recommendations that 
Panel recommendation. The BRC recommended that generally accepted auditing standards 
require such communication and that the requirement be written in a way “to encourage open, 
frank discussion and to avoid boilerplate.”
The Board fully endorses the BRC’s recommendation in that respect and the Auditing 
Standards Board’s efforts to establish a standard that will lead auditors to provide these 
qualitative and subjective communications to corporate boards and their audit committees in a 
meaningful fashion. We have significant reservations in three areas concerning the proposed 
revision of SAS No. 61:
1. The guidance is inadequate to achieve a meaningful communication about quality,
2. The workpaper documentation requirement is incomplete, and
3. The blanket prohibition of auditors communicating their qualitative judgments to audit 
committees in writing, while well-intentioned, may be unnecessary.
Qualitative Judgments to be Communicated
The POB recognizes the difficulty of writing a standard that will lend itself to consistent 
communications to audit committees about qualitative assessments of income and 
asset/liability measures and financial reporting disclosures that are inherently subjective in 
nature. The Auditing Standards Board (“ASB”), in response to a charge that it do so, chose to 
use terms in its guidance drawn from FASB Concepts Statement No. 2, Qualitative 
Characteristics of Accounting Information, —“representational faithfulness,” “verifiability,” 
“neutrality,” and “consistency”—rather than what the ASB describes as subjective 
determinations of “degrees of aggressiveness or conservatism.” The exclusive use of the terms 
taken from Concepts No. 2 may lose the flavor of the intention of the Panel and the BRC.
Earnings-management concerns rightfully focus on both ends of the spectrum in the 
application of acceptable reporting principles and practices. The ideal—high quality financial 
reporting—is the result of the application of those principles and practices by an unbiased 
preparer. Deviations from the ideal are what both the BRC and the POB’s Panel believe 
should be forthrightly and candidly brought to the attention of audit committees. Competent 
auditors can recognize deviations, whether caused by lack of knowledge or by purposeful bias.
We urge the ASB to keep the message for the audit committee clear and understandable. The 
discussion of "conservatism" in paragraph 96 of Concepts No. 2 is useful in this regard:
The Board emphasizes that any attempt to understate results consistently is 
likely to raise questions about the reliability and the integrity of information 
about those results and will probably be self-defeating in the long run. That 
kind of reporting, however well intentioned, is inconsistent with the desirable 
characteristics described in this Statement. On the other hand, the Board also 
emphasizes that imprudent reporting, such as may be reflected, for example, 
in overly optimistic estimates of realization, is certainly no less inconsistent 
with those characteristics. Bias in estimating components of earnings, 
whether overly conservative or unconservative, usually influences the 
timing of earnings or losses rather than their aggregate amount. As a 
result, unjustified excesses in either direction may mislead one group of 
investors to the possible benefit or detriment of others. (Emphasis added)
We believe this discussion of  "conservatism" offers an opportunity to link the words in the 
recommendations of the BRC and the 1994 Panel with the accounting literature.
3Aggressiveness can be defined as synonymous with unconservative for purposes of SAS No.
61. Our Board members who have considerable experience in serving on audit committees are 
confident that audit committee members will understand the message delivered by auditors if 
they identify practices that are bordering on or moving toward being overly conservative or 
overly aggressive. This “early warning” should enable an audit committee to better 
understand the quality of a company’s financial reporting. A communication couched solely 
or extensively in the terms selected from Concepts No. 2 (i.e., “representational faithfulness,” 
“verifiability,” “neutrality,” and “consistency”) is not likely to be an effective way to 
communicate with audit committees.
Michael R. Young, partner of Willkie Farr & Gallagher and editor of the manuscript entitled 
Accounting Irregularities and Financial Fraud, reaches a similar conclusion in the chapter he 
authored. In describing information that audit committees should obtain from outside 
auditors, Young would want the question asked: “Is management overly aggressive? Overly 
conservative?” In addition, he urges audit committees to discuss with the outside auditor the 
topic of managerial bias in the application of generally accepted accounting principles and to 
become satisfied that transactions and adjustments are “the natural consequence of business 
activity and not the manifestation of a desire to attain preestablished financial reporting 
targets.”
Documentation and Written Communication
The Board finds the last two sentences in paragraph 11 flawed. The last sentence states:
“.. .the auditor needs only document in the working papers that the discussion had taken place, 
the date of the discussion, and the participants.”
The recommended working paper documentation needs to be expanded to include a 
description of the matters discussed and views expressed. We believe that the working paper 
documentation of those matters should have a positive behavioral impact on the auditor, 
namely, it should lead the auditor to have the intended candid discussion with the audit 
committee about all matters significant to an evaluation of the quality of financial reporting. 
Also without that change, the spirit of the revised standard will be impossible to peer review.
We agree with the reasoning expressed in the article co-authored by Art Siegel, then chairman 
of the SECPS Executive Committee, and Don Kirk in the Journal of Accountancy, January 
1996, page 57: “In the event of litigation, the fact that some might believe that there are 
“better” practices will be apparent to plaintiffs from their own evaluations, and it should be 
helpful to the defense to have a record of thoughtful consideration of those alternatives before 
the financial statements were issued ”
The second to last sentence in paragraph 11 states, “...the auditor’s judgments should not be 
communicated in writing.” We recognize the purpose of this prohibition is to help achieve 
open, frank discussion and avoid boilerplate communications. However, the blanket 
prohibition is too restrictive. We can, for example, imagine circumstances where following 
the discussion an audit committee might want a memorandum from the auditor describing the 
matters discussed and the views expressed. In circumstances such as that, refusing to comply 
would serve no useful purpose.
In order to encourage open, frank discussion, avoid boilerplate and, at the same time, not 
prohibit all written communications, the standard might express a preference, such as: “In 
order to encourage open, frank discussion and avoid boilerplate reporting, it is preferable that
4any written communication by the auditor expressing views on the quality of financial 
reporting follow discussion of those matters with the audit committee.”
Auditor Responsibility to Communicate
The summary of the proposed statement indicates that the effectiveness of the proposal is 
dependent on the willingness of all parties to engage in the discussion and act on the 
implications. The preamble to the proposal notes among other things that the proposed 
statement encourages a three-way discussion among the auditor, management, and the audit 
committee and that management should play an active part in the discussion. The Board urges 
that the standard should clearly state that the auditor has a responsibility to communicate to 
the audit committee his/her qualitative assessments of the company’s financial reporting 
whether or not management chooses to play an active role in the discussion.
We appreciate the efforts of the Auditing Standards Board to establish reasonable standards 
for auditor communications with audit committees. If you have questions concerning our 
comments, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Charles A. Bowsher 
Chairman
cc: Panel on Audit Effectiveness
Donald's
McDonald's Corporation 
McDonald's Plaza
Oak Brook. Illinois 60523-1900
November 22, 1999
Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
File No. 2280
Dear Ms. Boothe:
McDonald’s Corporation appreciates the role of the Auditing Standards Board in proposing amendments 
to SAS No. 61, Communication with Audit Committees, and SAS No. 71, Interim Financial Information, 
in response to the Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the 
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees.
We clearly support the overall goal of improving the effectiveness of audit committees. We support the 
Board's proposed amendment to SAS No. 61 requiring auditors to discuss with the audit committee the 
auditor's judgment about the quality, not just the acceptability of a company's accounting principles as 
applied in its financial statements. However, we disagree with the proposed amendment to SAS No. 71.
While we believe that open meaningful dialogue among management, the outside auditors and the audit 
committee is vital to an audit committee's effectiveness, we do not believe that the auditor should be 
required to attempt to communicate with a company's audit committee, or at least its chairman, every 
quarter prior to the release of interim financial information or prior to the company filing interim financial 
information with the SEC. Time schedules and deadlines make this recommendation impractical to 
implement and could result in needless delays in the financial reporting process.
As a more feasible alternative, we recommend that the necessity of such a discussion be left to the 
judgment of the company’s financial management and its outside auditor depending upon individual 
circumstances (e.g., if there were significant judgments or adjustments impacting the results of the current 
quarter, such a discussion may be warranted). We believe that this approach would be more practical and 
more cost effective than a blanket rule requiring a fixed number of discussions each year. It would also 
help ensure that communications with audit committees are meaningful and useful to the company and its 
audit committee rather than merely being a statutory requirement. Since the outside auditor has 
unrestricted access to the audit committee, we believe that the combination of regularly scheduled 
meetings (that don’t need to coincide with quarterly earnings releases) and additional discussions when 
circumstances dictate ensures that all appropriate communication is taking place on a timely basis.
We appreciate your consideration of our comments and would be happy to discuss this topic with you in 
further detail. If you have any questions or comments and would like to discuss them further, please call 
me at (630) 623-3250.
Michael L. Conley 
Executive Vice President 
and Chief Financial Officer
Direct Dial Number
Sincerely,
702 Electronic Drive 
Horsham, PA 19044 USA
Tel 215 • 706 • 3800 
Fax 215 • 706 • 3801
Cell Pathways, Inc.
November 22, 1999
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Attention: Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards
Re: Proposed Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61,
Communication With Audit Committees, and Statement on Auditing Standards 
No. 71, Interim Financial Information (October 1, 1999)
File 2280
Ladies and Gentlemen:
Cell Pathways, Inc. is pleased to provide comments to the AICPA on its proposed 
amendments to SAS 61 and SAS 71 (the “Proposal” or "Proposals").
The comments of this letter may reflect the concerns of the hundreds of small publicly 
traded companies which do not have product sales or earnings and would not normally engage in 
auditor review of interim financial statements or discussions with audit committees at the time of 
interim financial statements.
This letter supports some of the proposals, but not all. In particular, we feel that there 
should be no implication that all publicly traded companies should be subject to quarterly 
reviews of interim financial statements, regardless of size, industry or state of development. On 
the contrary, such reviews should not be conducted where there is no purpose to be accomplished 
by the review. Many publicly traded companies lack sufficient economic substance to merit such 
reviews. Enclosed for your convenience is a copy of our comment letter to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission on their related proposals.
The Commenting Company
Cell Pathways was founded ten years ago to develop pharmaceutical agents to prevent 
cancer. It may be the only public company founded for this purpose. Its programs have since 
expanded to include cancer therapy, as well. It has no sales, no earnings. Some day we hope it 
will. It has about 60 employees. It formed an audit committee of outside directors about two 
years before becoming a public company. The development stage of the business does not merit 
either auditor review or audit committee review of earnings statements on a quarterly basis.
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SAS 61 - Communication with Audit Committees.
This proposal would add a requirement that auditors discuss with the audit committee the 
following matters concerning the auditors’ judgments about the quality (not just the acceptability) 
of the company’s accounting principles:
a. consistency of application of accounting policies
b. clarity, consistency and completeness of the accounting information 
contained in the financial statements and related disclosures
c. items that have a significant impact on the representational faithfulness, 
verifiability, neutrality, and consistency of the accounting information 
included in the financial statements, including, for example:
i. selection of new or changes to accounting policies
ii. estimates, judgments and uncertainties
iii. unusual transactions
iv. accounting policies relating to significant financial statement items, 
including the timing of transactions and the period in which they 
are recorded
The auditors would be not be permitted to communicate the above matters in writing to the audit 
committee (documentation of the discussion would appear in the audit work papers).
We do not oppose additional specificity about items to be discussed by the auditors with 
the audit committee, provided that the items have a basis in established standards as recognized 
in current accounting literature. This would mean that it would be acceptable to add specificity 
with respect to: consistency of application of accounting policies; consistency and completeness 
of accounting information; and verifiability and consistency of accounting information with 
respect to such matters as selection of new (or changes to) accounting policies, estimates, 
judgments and uncertainties, unusual transactions, and accounting policies relating to 
significant financial statement items (including the timing of transactions and the period in which 
they are recorded).
We do feel, however, that AICPA should not include the requirement to discuss the 
“quality” (not just the acceptability) of the company’s accounting principles. Auditors and audit 
committees may get into this area if they choose to; but it should not become mandatory. 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) is the historically recognized standard for 
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards and financial statement reporting. We should not 
introduce a foreign concept with no clearly and definitively established interpretation. The 
AICPA Proposal recognizes that there are no objective criteria for “quality.” Because of the lack 
of criteria, the Proposal prohibits the auditor from communicating its judgments about “quality” 
in writing. In short, there no sound basis upon which to subject companies and their audit 
committees to a requirement to discuss a non-standard standard for financial statements, or to
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possibly become liable under such non-standard standards, or to become liable for discussing 
such non-standard standards. If adopted, this part of the Proposal would expand the bases of 
potential litigation and liability, and, to a corresponding extent, discourage qualified individuals 
from becoming entangled in the activities of audit committees.
We recommend that the words “the auditor’s judgments about the quality, not just the 
acceptability, of’ be deleted from proposed subsection .11 of SAS 61 (AU sec. 380.11).
Also, we are concerned about the meaning of the term “representational faithfulness” and 
we suggest that it be deleted unless univocal clarity of meaning can be established.
In the same vein, the words “clarity” and “neutrality” seem neither clear nor neutral; they 
lack established meaning which can be determined by objective criteria; they should be omitted.
If the above amendment is accomplished, then the last three sentences of proposed 
subsection .11, dealing with the lack of objective criteria and the prohibition on written 
communications would not be required.
Importantly, the text should make clear that these procedures apply only: (a) to such 
interim reviews as are actually conducted, and (b) to the extent that the company has and utilizes 
an audit committee. These procedures should not be misconstrued as requiring that there be 
interim reviews of quarterly financial statements (which would be beyond the purview of AICPA 
and of statements of either accounting or auditing principle), or that companies either have or use 
audit committees (which also would be beyond the purview of AICPA and statements of either 
accounting or auditing principle). Where interim reviews are, in fact, conducted, but a company 
does not have an audit committee, the proposal should make provision for discussion with the 
board of directors or other senior body of the company.
Finally, the proposal should make it clear that the discussion with the audit committee (or 
other senior body of the company) should be preceded by similar discussion with those in the 
company responsible for accounting, internal audit and other aspects of the financial control 
apparatus of the company.
SAS 71 - Interim Financial Information.
The Proposal would amend SAS 71 to require the auditors to have the SAS 61 
discussions (presently required only for annual audits) in connection with a review of interim 
financials. In particular, the auditor would have to communicate to the audit committee, or be 
satisfied through discussions with the audit committee that management communicated to the 
committee, matters described in SAS 61 that have been identified in the conduct of the interim 
financial review.
We think it is a good idea that there be a discussion of SAS 61 information that has been 
identified related to interim financial statements, but only if the content and extent of the SAS 61
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information does not go beyond the current Proposal as changed as discussed above, including 
deletion of the requirement to discuss the “quality” of accounting principles.
For those companies whose auditors do not currently conduct SAS 61-type reviews with 
respect to interim financial statements, the requirement would add additional cost and delays in 
release of interim financial statements. Thus, as discussed above, care should be taken to avoid 
any implication that interim reviews of quarterly financial statements are mandatory.
A further aspect of the Proposal is that, where an interim review is performed, the 
auditors would be required to attempt to discuss the SAS 61 matters with the audit committee or 
at least the committee chairperson, and a representative of financial management, prior to the 
filing of the Form 10-Q and, if possible, prior to a public announcement of interim financial 
results. We are not in disagreement with the principles that, where an interim review is, in fact, 
performed, the independent auditor have timely access to the audit committee, or at least the 
chair of the committee, and company financial management to discuss SAS 61 matters identified 
with respect to interim financial statements prior to filing the Form 10-Q. We have deep 
reservations, however, with the proposed amendment to SAS 71, particularly as it applies to 
public announcements of interim results.
While it is preferable to have the audit committee discussions, if they are to occur, prior 
to release of earnings, it may not be practicable to achieve this. We are informed that many 
companies have not actually completed their financial statements by the time they announce 
earnings. The physically disparate location of audit committee members poses another practical 
problem. Retroactive discussion loses much of its purpose and creates the dilemma of whether to 
create a record of second-guessing the already-released earnings.
Hence, where interim reviews are undertaken, the matter of discussions prior to public 
announcement should be modified to be a recommended best practice. SAS 61 should make 
clear: that companies are not required to delay the timing of their earnings releases; and that 
companies are not required to take on additional burdens in order to have the discussion with the 
audit committee (or member) prior to the release of earnings.
Again, as above, the text should make clear that the proposed procedures as to auditor 
discussion with the audit committee apply only: (a) to such interim reviews as are actually 
conducted, and (b) to the extent that the company has and utilizes an audit committee. These 
procedures should not be misconstrued as requiring that there be interim reviews of quarterly 
financial statements (which would be beyond the purview of AICPA and of statements of either 
accounting or auditing principal), or that companies either have or use audit committees (which 
also would be beyond the purview of AICPA and or statements of either accounting or auditing 
principle). Where interim reviews are conducted but a company does not have an audit 
committee, the proposal should make provision for discussion with the board of directors or 
other senior body of the company.
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We appreciate this opportunity to comment on the Proposals and would be pleased to 
answer any questions you may have. You may reach me at 215-706-3840.
Richard H. Troy 
Senior Vice President, Corporate Development
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INCORPORATED
AMERICA ONLINE
November 23, 1999
Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards
File 2280
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
RE: Exposure Draft - Proposed Amendments to SAS No. 61 and SAS No.71
Dear Ms. Boothe:
We support the AICPA Auditing Standards Board’s effort to propose rule changes amending SAS No. 61, 
Communication with Audit Committees, and SAS No. 71, Interim Financial Information. We understand 
that these changes are in response to the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the 
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees. However, we respectfully offer the following views 
regarding each of the proposals.
Proposed Amendment to SAS No. 71, Interim Financial Information
We support this proposal to require the auditors to communicate to the audit committee or be satisfied, 
through discussions with the audit committee, that matters described in SAS No. 61 have been 
communicated to the audit committee by the management of the company when such matters have been 
identified in the conduct of interim financial reporting and prior to a public announcement of interim 
information, or as soon as practicable thereafter.
Proposed Amendment to SAS No. 61, Communication with Audit Committees
We do not support the proposal to require the auditor to discuss certain information relating to the auditor’s 
judgments about the quality, not just the acceptability, of the company’s accounting principles with the 
audit committees of SEC clients. It appears to us that either the financial statements are or are not in 
conformity with GAAP. Accordingly, the discussion regarding the quality of the company’s accounting 
principles would not provide any additional benefits. Any discussions on the thinking behind choices from 
allowable alternatives, particular company or industry considerations, clarity of presentation, and other 
judgmental issues should be handled in the normal dialogue that occurs between management, the auditors 
and the audit committee, which is currently required by SAS No. 61.
We appreciate this opportunity to comment on the AICPA Auditing Standards Board’s proposed 
amendments to SAS No. 61 and SAS No.71. We would be pleased to discuss our comments with you at 
your convenience.
Sincerely,
Mark Wovsaniker
Vice President, Accounting Policy
22000 AOL Way • Dulles, Virginia 20166-9323 
http://www.aol.com/
First Midwest
#8
First Midwest Bancorp. Inc. 
300 Park Blvd., Suite 405 
P.O. Box 459
Itasca. Illinois 60143-9768 
(630) 875-7450
November 24, 1999
Auditing Standards
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
Harborside Financial Center 
201 Plaza Three
Jersey City, New Jersey 07311-3881
RE: Proposed Amendments to SAS No. 61 and SAS No. 71
Gentlemen:
The Auditing Standards Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has proposed 
amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards ("SAS") No. 61, Communications with Audit 
Committees, and SAS No. 71, Interim Financial Information. The proposed amendments are based on 
recommendations made earlier this year by the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness 
of Corporate Audit Committees.
Proposed amendments to SAS No. 71 would require discussions between independent auditors and the 
audit committee of matters described in SAS No. 61. First Midwest Bancorp, Inc.("First Midwest") and 
the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors of First Midwest (the "Audit Committee") believe, that 
such discussions should not be required prior to the filing of Form 10-Q, or prior to public announcement 
of interim financial information.
This requirement, if adopted, would impose additional and unnecessary burdens on audit committees, 
would result in additional costs to First Midwest, and expose audit committee members to greater risk of 
personal liability. We do not believe that having discussions with audit committees prior to the filing of 
Form 10-Q will result in more reliable or credible interim financial statements - particularly where the 
required quarterly reviews under SAS No. 61 reveal no significant adjustments, changes in estimates, 
significant new accounting policies or disagreements with management. While First Midwest opposes the 
adoption of specific rules regarding the timing of discussion between audit committees and the independent 
auditors, any such requirement should be limited to situations where the attention of the audit committee 
is warranted. To require such discussion in other situations is cost ineffective and counterproductive.
Questions regarding these comments may be directed to the undersigned at (630) 875-7458.
Very truly yours,
 
Jay R. Lundborg
Senior Vice President and
Audit Services Director
JRL/ali
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AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CORPORATION
FIVE GIRALDA FARMS, MADISON. NEW JERSEY 07940 (973) 660-5010. FAX (973) 660-7277
November 29, 1999
PAUL J. JONES
VICE PRESIDENT-COMPTROLLER
Mr. Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary
U.S, Securities and Exchange Commission
450 Fifth Street, N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20549
Subject: SEC PROPOSALS REGARDING AUDIT COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE
Dear Mr. Katz:
In response to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) release proposing new 
requirements for corporate audit committees (the “Proposal”), enclosed are our comments for 
your review and consideration. For the sake of clarity, we have included a brief outline of the 
proposals along with our comments.
Pre-Filing Review of Quarterly Financial Statements
The Proposal would require that a company’s independent auditors perform a SAS No. 71 
“Interim Financial Information” review of the financial information included in the 
company’s Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q prior to the company filing such forms with 
the SEC.
Procedures for a SAS No. 71 review of interim financial information consists principally of 
applying analytical procedures to financial data and making inquiries of persons responsible for 
financial and accounting matters. Accordingly, while such reviews could be performed without a 
significant increase in costs, we do not believe they would have a significant impact on the 
reliability of interim financial statements, the extent of year-end audit procedures, or result in 
fewer restatements of interim financial statements. Further, we believe that the Blue Ribbon 
Committee (“BRC”) recommendation to amend SAS No. 71 to require that the audit committee 
discuss with the auditors certain matters including significant adjustments, management 
judgments and accounting estimates, significant new accounting policies, and disagreements 
with management prior to the filing of the Form 10-Q is even less desirable. Thus, we continue 
to oppose this recommendation via copy of this letter to the Auditing Standards Board of the
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AICPA, The preparation and presentation of the annual and interim financial information is a 
management responsibility and does not belong with the audit committee. The involvement and 
review by the audit committee or its chairperson would be impractical prior to the filing of each 
quarterly report on Form 10-Q. Moreover, it would not be unreasonable to anticipate that the 
audit committee responsibilities with respect to the reports on Form 10-Q may eventually lead to 
audit committee involvement prior to the public release of quarterly financial results, thus 
imposing even greater burdens on these outside directors. Accordingly, we feel that the 
responsibilities and time involved in these tasks may discourage qualified individuals from 
participating on audit committees.
The Audit Committee Report
The Proposal would require that the audit committee provide a report in the company’s 
proxy statement disclosing whether or not the audit committee has reviewed and discussed 
the audited financial statements with management, discussed certain matters with the 
independent auditors and received certain disclosures from the independent auditors, and 
discussed the auditors’ independence with the auditors.
The Proposal would require the audit committee to also state in its report whether, based 
on the review and discussions described above, anything came to the attention of the 
members of the audit committee that caused the audit committee to believe that the audited 
financial statements included in the company’s annual report contained an untrue 
statement of material fact or omitted to state a material fact necessary to make the 
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading. The disclosure would appear over the names of the audit committee members.
We do not believe that this requirement will provide any meaningful benefit from a shareholder’s 
point of view, nor do we believe that it would reinforce the audit committee's awareness and 
acceptance of its responsibilities. In our opinion, the existence of an audit committee implicitly 
confirms that discussions with management and the auditors should be occurring without the 
need for written disclosure. The audit committee has responsibility for selecting an external 
auditor but it remains the external auditor’s role to perform the audit and to report on the annual 
financial statements of the company. As stated in the Proposal, existing SEC rules require the 
current annual report to shareholders to include a Report of Independent Public Accountants and 
for the Annual Report on Form 10-K to be executed by a majority of the members of the board of 
directors. Therefore, we believe there would be no benefit to including an additional 
representation from the audit committee or by having their names appear under such a disclosure.
Audit Committee Charters
The Proposal would require companies to disclose in their proxy statements whether or not 
the audit committee is governed by a charter. In addition, if the audit committee has a 
charter, a copy of the charter would have to be included as an appendix to the proxy 
statement at least once every three years. The Proposal would not require companies to 
adopt audit committee charters, or dictate the content of the charter if one is adopted.
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Additionally, any statements about whether the audit committee has complied with the 
charter are not required.
Although we consider the maintenance of an effective comprehensive audit committee charter to 
be a prudent business practice, we believe that including the charter in the proxy statement to 
shareholders every three years is unnecessary. We suggest that the charter be included as an 
exhibit to the Annual Report on Form 10-K and that any significant changes be disclosed in the 
proxy statement. The concern expressed in the Proposal regarding the risk of broadly worded 
and vague committee charters to minimize committee members’ exposure is, in our view valid, 
and can only be mitigated if the NYSE or SEC were to provide specific guidance as to the form 
and content of a charter.
Disclosure Regarding the Independence of Audit Committee Members
The Proposal would require companies to disclose in their proxy statements certain 
information regarding any member of the audit committee who is not independent.
We agree with the SEC’s position on the importance of having an audit committee that is 
comprised of independent directors, and believe that shareholders should be informed when an 
audit committee director is not independent. Accordingly, we concur with the proxy disclosure 
requirements, that upon the appointment of a non-independent director to the audit committee, 
the nature of the relationship that makes that individual not independent and the reasons for the 
board's determination should be disclosed.
Proposed Safe Harbors
The Proposal proposes to establish “safe harbors” pertaining to the information required 
to be disclosed under the proposals in an effort to protect companies and their directors 
from certain liabilities under the federal securities laws.
We agree with the proposal to adopt liability ‘‘safe harbors” to cover the new disclosure 
requirements.
If you would like to discuss any of the above comments, please feel free to call me at 
(973) 660-5010.
Very truly yours,
cc: John R. Stafford
Robert G. Blount 
Louis L. Hoynes, Jr. 
Auditing Standards Board
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COMMENT LETTER #10
Intel Corporation
Intel
November 22, 1999
Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2280
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Re: Proposed Amendments to SAS No. 61 Communication with Audit Committee and SAS 
No. 71, Interim Financial Information
Dear Ms. Boothe:
Intel welcomes this opportunity to comment on the subject proposed amendments. We support 
the clarifying guidance for content of discussions with the Audit Committee in SAS No. 61. 
However we consider the proposal for accountant and audit committee communication prior to 
a company’s public announcement of interim financial information in SAS 71 to be 
unrealistic. This communication will delay the release of our financial results without adding 
any commensurate value. The earnings release process at Intel involves numerous groups and 
the document goes through many draft stages. The involvement of the audit committee would 
neither improve the process nor establish useful oversight or control. Thus it is more likely 
that such communication will transpire as soon as practicable after the public announcement.
Sincerely,
Andy Bryant
Senior Vice President 
Chief Financial Officer
COMMENT LETTER #11
November 24, 1999
Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2280 
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Boothe:
The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) appreciates the opportunity to submit our comments to 
the AICPA Auditing Standards Board’s (ASB) proposed amendments to Statements on 
Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 61, Communication With Audit Committees, and SAS No. 71, 
Interim Financial Information. The IIA is very supportive of the efforts the Blue Ribbon 
Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (BRC).
Although the ASB has chosen to limit application of the amendment of SAS No. 61 to SEC 
clients, The IIA believes that discussions with non-SEC clients concerning the auditor’s 
judgements about the quality of the entity’s accounting principles would also be beneficial. 
Our concern is that non-public companies may also have significant stakeholders whose 
interests are not protected by this limitation. These stakeholders could include pension and 
other retirement plan participants, private investors, lenders, and others who rely on audited 
financial statements.
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) recently 
published the study, Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997 An Analysis of U.S. Public 
Companies (COSO Report). The COSO Report findings revealed that companies committing 
fraud generally were small, and in most cases were not listed on the New York or American 
Stock Exchanges. The COSO Report also found that audit committees and boards of these 
companies were weak and rarely met. Some would argue based on these findings that one 
could also conclude that non-public companies could be more susceptible to fraud due to the 
lack of best practice reporting requirements such as those imposed by the SEC and ASB. 
Although additional best practice requirements are needed for such companies, application of 
the amendment of SAS No. 61 to all clients would be a step in the right direction that COSO’s 
“tone-at-the-top” philosophy supports.
We also suggest that the auditor document not only that the discussion has taken place, date of 
the discussion, and the participants, but also the specific topics or items discussed. While an 
auditor’s judgement may be prone to subjective evaluations in the absence of objective criteria, 
a listing of the specific topics discussed will facilitate future discussions and work related to 
the items discussed. Such a list can be compiled without documenting the auditor’s 
judgements.
In the amendment to SAS No. 71, paragraph .26, states “...he or she should attempt to make 
such communications with the audit committee...” Use of the word “attempt,” without 
providing guidance as to what would satisfy an “attempt”, appears to weaken this amendment 
and make determinations of compliance difficult. We suggest changing the amendment to 
read “... he or she should ensure that such communications with the audit committee...” 
Further, we would add a sentence that reads “If the auditor is unable to ensure that such 
communications occur prior to filing and/or public release of interim financial information, the 
auditor should document their attempts to communicate with the client.”
Established in 1941, The Institute of Internal Auditors is an international professional 
organization with world headquarters in Altamonte Springs, Florida. The IIA has over 70,000 
members in internal auditing, governance, internal control, IT audit, education, and security. 
With representation from more than 100 countries, The Institute is the acknowledged leader in 
standards, certification, education, research, and technological guidance for the profession 
worldwide.
Thank you again for allowing The IIA to provide our comments. If The IIA can provide 
further assistance, please feel free to call me.
Sincerely,
William G. Bishop III, CIA
#12
SECTION OF
BUSINESS LAW
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
Defending Liberty 
Pursuing Justice
Section of Business Law
750 North Lake Shore Drive
Chicago, Illinois 60611
(312) 988-5588
FAX: (312) 988-5578
e-mail; businesslaw@abanet.org
website: www.gbanet.org/buslaw
November 30, 1999
Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2280
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: Exposure Draft, Proposed Statement of Auditing Standards,
Amendments to Statements on Auditing Standards ("SAS”) #61 and #71
Dear Ms. Boothe:
The Committee on Law and Accounting of the Section of Business Law of the 
American Bar Association (the "Committee") appreciates the opportunity to comment on 
the Exposure Draft described above relating to communications by auditors with audit 
committees. This comment letter has been prepared by certain members of the Committee; 
and a draft of this letter was circulated for comment among select members of the 
Committee. All persons generally agreed with the substance of this draft. However, our 
letter does not represent the official views of the Association, the Section or any of their 
committees or subcommittees.
The Committee believes that the improvement of the effectiveness of audit 
committees will have a significant beneficial impact upon financial reporting. Appropriate 
and timely communication between an auditor and the audit committee will contribute 
substantially to the effectiveness of audit committees. Accordingly, the Committee believes 
that the proposed amendments to SAS #61 and #71 are positive pronouncements generally, 
subject however, to the Committee’s following comments and suggestions:
As to SAS #61. We are in agreement with the Exposure Draft insofar as it requires 
an auditor of Securities and Exchange Commission clients to discuss with the audit 
committee judgments about the quality, and not just the acceptability, of the company’s 
accounting principles and underlying estimates in its financial statements in accordance with 
the definitions set forth in FASB Concepts Statement #2. While there are valid positions 
pro and con on the issue of written communication by the auditor concerning the discussion 
and in what detail to communicate, on balance, we do not believe that the auditor should be 
precluded from communicating his or her judgments to the audit committee in writing.
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Whether or not the auditor memorializes the discussion with a written communication as 
well as the details thereof and whether such a communication would stifle an open and 
frank discussion with the audit committee should remain a judgment call by the auditor, 
possibly in consultation with the audit committee. Indeed it is not unusual for the audit 
committee itself to make appropriate notes or memoranda concerning the discussion. Nor 
should the auditor be limited in documenting the discussion in the auditor’s working papers 
Accordingly, it is difficult to understand how the interests of either the audit committee or 
the auditor are served by a blanket rule barring communicating by the latter to the former.
While the Blue Ribbon Committee’s recommendations did not contemplate 
management’s participation in the discussions between the auditor and the audit committee, 
it is to be noted that the Exposure Draft assumes that management would be included as a 
participant. We do not believe that such assumption should be included in the language of 
the amendment. Again the choice of a two-way meeting or a three-way meeting or in some 
cases two meetings, one between the auditors and the audit committee and the other with 
the participation of management, should be based entirely on the facts and circumstances 
involved and the judgment of the auditor and the audit committee.
As to SAS #71. The Exposure Draft provides that if the entity intends to release 
interim financial information in a public announcement prior to the filing of the interim 
financial information with a regulatory agency (such as the SEC) the auditor should attempt 
to communicate any identified matters described in AU380 to the audit committee, or at 
least its chairman. We believe that the word "attempt" may place too much of a burden 
upon the auditor particularly when the timing of the release of the information may be 
affected. Accordingly, we suggest that the auditor’s role under these circumstances should 
be limited to an offer or indication of availability to make such communication.
We appreciate this opportunity to comment on the Exposure Draft and should you 
have any further questions, please contact Richard Rowe at (202) 416-6800 or Abraham 
Stanger at (212) 218-5500.
Respectfully submitted,
C Accounting
Abranam M. Stanger 
Chairman of the Drafting Group
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Roger L. Polark 
Senior Vice President
and Chief Financial Officer
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Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2280
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Boothe:
After careful review of the AICPA’s October 1 Exposure Draft, Proposed Statement on Auditing 
Standards, Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61 Communication with Audit 
Committees (SAS No. 61) and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71 Interim Financial 
Information (SAS No. 71), we at Walgreen Co. wish to express concern regarding certain of those 
recommendations. We previously expressed related concerns in a July 1, 1999 letter to the New 
York Stock Exchange and in a November 24, 1999 letter to the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission.
We agree that there is a need for active, independent audit committees that provide oversight and 
monitoring of the financial reporting process. Thus, we support the AICPA’s efforts to improve the 
quality of corporate financial reporting. However, we continue to have strong reservations about 
certain of the recommendations that have been included in the AICPA’s proposed rules. In our 
view, the proposed rules may decrease the responsibilities of outside auditors and transfer some of 
their long-held responsibilities to boards of directors and audit committees. This, in turn, creates 
new liabilities that may be pursued by increasingly litigious shareholder groups and their attorneys.
We believe that the Walgreen Co. audit committee adheres to the underlying principles espoused in 
the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees' 
report. We also believe that our audit committee acts in concert with the full board, company 
financial management, our internal auditors and our external auditors to support full disclosure, 
transparency and accountability. However, for the reasons stated, we take exception to the 
following items:
The Committee’s recommendation 8, while rightfully encouraging an open, frank discussion of 
accounting practices, adds a requirement for audit committee members to become knowledgeable 
of the “quality” of the company’s accounting principles. In our letter to the New York Stock 
Exchange we expressed concern that this requirement transfers a responsibility traditionally placed 
on outside auditors and presumes that committee members could fully appreciate the many nuances 
which may affect each decision made by company financial management. We acknowledge 
AICPA’s attempt to address certain subjective matters in Recommendation 8 by eliminating 
terminology such as “degree of aggressiveness or conservatism” in its proposed amendment to SAS 
No. 61. We continue to believe, however, that because the term “quality” is undefined, any 
application will be so subjective as to be meaningless. Outside auditors are and should be 
responsible for reporting whether a company is adhering to Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles.
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In our letter to the New York Stock Exchange, we expressed concern that the Committee’s 
recommendation 10 creates an unnecessary requirement for a quarterly discussion between the 
outside auditor and one or more audit committee members, which may delay the timeliness of 
reporting. We acknowledge that the AIPCA, in its proposed amendment to SAS No. 71, attempts 
to respond to this concern by modifying the requirement so that the outside auditor does not have to 
make communication of SAS No. 61 matters directly to the audit committee, but rather can satisfy 
him or her self that management has made such communication via discussion with the audit 
committee. This modification does not eliminate mandatory quarterly communication between the 
outside auditor and the audit committee. Furthermore, the proposed amendment to SAS No. 71 
still requires that the outside auditor attempt to discuss SAS No. 61 matters with the audit 
committee prior to the filing of interim information with a regulatory agency, as well as prior to a 
public announcement of such interim information. We continue to believe that such discussion 
should take place when matters of significance arise, but should not be required in the absence of 
such matters.
We remain supportive of ongoing efforts to ensure adequate oversight and monitoring of financial 
statement preparation, and we appreciate your review and consideration of the foregoing 
comments.
Sincerely,
Mr. R. L. Polark 
Chief Financial Officer
#14
Scott A. Scherff
Corporate Secretary
WORLDWIDE LEADER IN BEARINGS AND STEEL
November 24, 1999
Mr. Jonathan G. Katz
Secretary
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
450 Fifth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20549-0609
Re: File No. S7-22-99
Dear Mr. Katz:
The Timken Company offers the following comments in connection with new rules proposed by the 
SEC intended to improve disclosure related to the functioning of corporate audit committees and to 
enhance the reliability and credibility of financial statements of public companies.
We believe the most significant issue raised by the proposed rule changes is the shifting of the 
responsibility for the accuracy of the company’s financial statements from management and the 
inside and outside auditors to the audit committee, and the resultant risk of increased liability to 
members of the audit committee. These increased risks are not offset by any significant advantages 
to the financial reporting process because the audit committee’s responsibility is to oversee this 
process, the adequacy of which is the primary responsibility of management and the auditors.
While the Commission did not adopt the Blue Ribbon Committee’s recommendation that the audit 
committee certify that the company’s financial statements are fairly presented in conformity with 
GAAP in all material respects, it does require that the audit committee disclose any material 
misstatements or omissions that come to its attention as a result of the review and discussions with 
management and the inside and outside auditors. In order to avoid the increased liability exposure 
discussed below, the result of these added requirements may be to cause the audit committee to 
micro-manage the audit process or second-guess the decisions made by management and the 
auditors in preparing the financial statements.
No amount of accounting or financial expertise will compensate for the fact that the accounting rules 
are ambiguous and complex. Inside and outside auditors are experts at analyzing and applying 
these rules, and yet problems occur. The primary function of the audit
committee is and should remain oversight, not management, of the financial
reporting process.
Telephone: (330)471-4226 
Facsimile: (330) 471-3541 
E-mail: scherff@timken.com
Mail Code: GNE-01 
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U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
Washington, D.C. 20549-0609
In addition, the increased responsibilities of the audit committee resulting from adoption of these 
rules will significantly increase the time commitment of the members of the audit committee. In 
conjunction with the potential for increased liability, these rules may discourage the recruitment 
and/or retention of qualified directors for appointment to the audit committee. Ironically, this may 
result in a decrease in the quality of oversight by audit committees.
The Commission has stated that it does not intend, by its proposed rules, to create new standards for 
directors to fulfill their duties under state corporation law. In addition, the Commission does not 
believe that its proposed rule changes will result in increased exposure to liability for members of the 
audit committee. Indeed, the Commission believes that increased involvement by the audit 
committee would decrease liability exposure under state corporation law because the more informed 
the audit committee members become through its discussions with management and the auditors, the 
more likely the business judgment rule will apply and provide protection for the audit committee’s 
activities.
The flaw in this reasoning is that the Commission’s proposed rules are disclosure requirements. The 
liability exposure is two-fold. First, if the audit committee has discussions with management and the 
outside auditors and fails to notice any material misstatements or omissions, and problems 
subsequently arise related to the company’s financial statements, such failure would lead the 
plaintiff's bar to question the adequacy of those discussions. Second, if the audit committee chooses 
not to have discussions with the outside auditors and management, and problems subsequently arise, 
the plaintiff's bar will argue the committee failed to perform its duties by not conducting such 
discussions. In effect, these disclosure rules will likely cause substantive changes in how the audit 
committee operates.
We believe the appropriate role of the audit committee in connection with the financial reporting 
process is oversight of management and the internal and external auditors. It is inappropriate and, in 
fact, counterproductive to require the audit committee to make representations about the accuracy of 
the company’s financial statements.
We are also concerned about one of the requirements imposed by the New York Stock Exchange in 
connection with the charter of the audit committee. A copy of such charter would be required to be 
included as a part of a company’s proxy statement every three years under the SEC proposal. This 
requirement directs the audit committee to recommend “that the Board of Directors take appropriate 
action to ensure (emphasis added) the independence of the outside auditor.” While it is certainly 
appropriate for the audit committee to receive periodic reports from the outside auditors regarding 
relationships outside the audit function and to engage in a dialogue with respect to such 
relationships, as is also required by the NYSE as part of the charter, it is very difficult to “ensure” 
independence. As a result of such a dialogue, the committee may be in a position to make certain 
recommendations to the Board regarding the outside auditors, but such recommendations would not 
necessarily result in any assurance that the auditors will be independent. To place such a burden on 
the audit committee is unreasonable, and could raise liability concerns if a problem were to surface 
that is somehow related to the independence of the outside auditors. The phrase “and for 
recommending that the Board of Directors take appropriate action to ensure the independence of the
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U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
Washington, D.C. 20549-0609
outside auditor” should be stricken from the proposed Section 303.01 (B)(1)(b) of the NYSE Listed 
Company Manual.
A third issue of concern that arises from the SEC proposal is connected to the requirement that 
companies’ independent auditors review interim financial statements before they are filed with the 
Commission. The problem arises from the proposed revisions to SAS 71 by the Auditing Standards 
Board.
SAS 71 sets forth the procedure the auditors are required to follow for interim reviews. The 
proposed revisions would require involvement by the audit committee, or at least its chair, every 
quarter, whether or not any significant issues arose in connection with the review. Such a 
requirement is unduly burdensome, and will not improve the quality of financial reporting or 
disclosure. While we support contact with the audit committee if items of significance are 
discovered in the interim review, the time of the committee chair and other members should not be 
imposed upon on a routine basis without good reason. As previously noted, significantly increasing 
the time commitments of members of the audit committee may discourage the service of qualified 
directors on the committee.
We appreciate the opportunity to provide our comments on the proposals, and believe our suggested 
changes would enhance the overall recommendations.
cc: Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards 
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775 
Re: File 2280
THE TIMKEN COMPANY
COMMENT LETTER #15
November 29, 1999
Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2280
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the •Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Boothe:
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP appreciates the opportunity to comment on the proposed 
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS), Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 
61, Communication with Audit Committees, and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71, 
Interim Financial Information.
We consistently have been supportive of the efforts of the Blue Ribbon Committee on 
Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (Blue Ribbon Committee), and 
our CEO, James Schiro, was a member of the Committee. In this regard, we view the various 
proposals by the New York Stock Exchange, the National Association of Securities Dealers, 
the American Stock Exchange, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Auditing 
Standards Board as consistent with the intent of the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon 
Committee. We believe the combined impact of these rules will lead to a marked 
improvement in financial reporting through the interactive efforts of audit committees, 
management, and external auditors.
In this connection, we support the final issuance of the proposed SAS. We have a few 
comments regarding specific aspects of the proposal that we submit for your consideration.
Part 1 - Communication with Audit Committees
Substance of the Communication
We are concerned that the technical language used to describe the substance of the discussion 
(particularly the references to representational faithfulness, verifiability, neutrality and 
consistency) may not be understandable to many practitioners, and certainly not 
understandable to most audit committee members, who may look to this language to help them 
frame their discussion with their auditors. Accordingly, we suggest that the fourth sentence of 
proposed paragraph 11 be revised as follows: “The discussion should also include the impact 
on the accounting information included in the financial statements of items such as the 
following, if they are significant to the financial statements: ...”
The original Blue Ribbon Committee recommendation suggested that the discussion include 
“such issues as the clarity of the company’s financial disclosures and degree of aggressiveness 
or conservatism of the company’s accounting principles and underlying estimates and other 
significant decisions made by management in preparing the financial disclosure.” The current 
proposal refers to “the clarity ... of the entity’s accounting information contained in the 
financial statements and related disclosures...” but not the “degree of aggressiveness or 
conservatism” referred to above. We understand that some believe that the concept of 
aggressiveness or conservatism is ambiguous and subjective. Nevertheless, we believe that 
these terms, while not easily defined, are relatively easily understood in financial circles and 
can serve as a useful benchmark for audit committee members. We would not object to the 
inclusion of these concepts in the final standard.
Documentation of the Communication
The last two sentences of the proposed new paragraph 11 are an attempt to encourage an open 
and frank discussion by not having the discussion hindered by the creation of a written record. 
However, we are concerned that the sentences, as written, do not give adequate guidance on 
the kind of written record that could be maintained by the auditor. Furthermore, we question 
whether it is appropriate to restrict such a writing by the auditor. We suggest that these two 
sentences be deleted, and that the auditor be permitted to use his or her discretion in creating 
the appropriate documentation of such communication. If this change is made, the suggested 
addition to paragraph 03 is not needed.
Part 2 - Interim Financial Information
The proposal indicates that the accountant should attempt to make the communication prior to 
a public announcement of interim information if one is made. We believe that mandating such 
communication prior to the earnings release would be both impractical and counterproductive. 
Recognizing concerns about insider trading and differential disclosures, companies know they 
need to release their quarterly earnings as soon as practicable. On the other hand, while 
companies and their accountants are best served by discussing significant accounting matters 
prior to earnings release, many aspects of the accountant’s review can, of necessity, only be 
conducted after the company closes its books and prepares complete financial statements. 
Compressing the timeframe for audit committee communications, and the associated pressure 
to complete the review prior to such communication, may lead to either delays in 
dissemination of financial information to the marketplace or pressure on the accountant to 
reach premature conclusions.
Therefore, we suggest that the requirement for communication be limited to prior to the filing 
of interim information with a regulatory agency.
***** *
If you have any questions regarding our comments, please feel free to contact James Gerson at 
(973) 236 7247.
Very truly yours,
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
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Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2280
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc.
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: Amendments to Statements on Auditing Standards No. 61 and No. 71
Dear Ms. Boothe:
Exxon Corporation would like to make the comments contained in this letter on the 
proposed amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61 (”SAS 61") and No. 71 
("SAS 71"). The Exposure Draft dated October 1, 1999 proposed amendments of SAS 61 that 
would add paragraph 11 describing the discussion the auditor should have with the audit 
committee about the quality of the entity’s accounting principles. We believe paragraph 11 
covers the subject very well. In particular we agree that management should be an active 
participant in the discussion. Frequently it should prove helpful to have the active 
involvement of those who prepared the financial information and who can best address the 
reasons for the choices made in accounting principles. At the same time, if the auditor desires 
to speak to the audit committee alone, there should be an opportunity to do so.
We also support the decision to provide for an oral rather than a written 
communication on this subject. We believe that the goal of an open and frank discussion is an 
important purpose of this provision. That goal will be better served y oral communication.
As proposed in the Exposure Draft dated October 1, 1999, SAS 71 would include a new 
paragraph .26. It would require an auditor who has conducted a review of an entity's interim 
financial information prior to an SEC filing to attempt to communicate with the audit 
committee (or at least its chairman) and a representative financial management prior to such 
filing. We have no objection to that proposal. In fact, we have already undertaken such a 
communication prior to the filing of Exxon's Form 10-Q for the third quarter of 1999.
However, proposed paragraph .26 further requires the auditor to attempt to make such 
communication prior to the public announcement of such interim financial information, if it is
to be released prior to SEC filing. We believe this second requirement is a poor policy
decision, is counterproductive, and should be
deleted from the final form of paragraph .26 when it is adopted.
The vast majority of companies which are the subject of paragraph .26 (if not all of 
them) do release their interim financial information prior to the required filing of the Form 10- 
Q. This fulfills a valid investor desire for prompt financial information. Moreover, that 
information can be very market sensitive, depending on the results released. We think it 
would be a bad idea to be distributing such information to the members of the audit committee 
prior to public release of the information. Most importantly, the chance of market sensitive 
information falling into the hands of unintended recipients would be increased. This would be 
contrary to the strong effort by SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt, to prevents me market 
participants receiving material information prior to its public release.
Furthermore, even if the confidentiality of the interim financial information could be 
assured (which it cannot be), the public release of the information would be delayed.
Providing audit committee members a copy of the information (and allowing time for them to 
review it) and providing the auditor the opportunity to speak to them on an informed basis 
would have to delay the release of this information. Our estimate would be a delay of at least 
one day. In a market where t is clear that there are substantial demands for release of such 
information as promptly as possible, such a delay is totally counterproductive to the interests 
of the market participants that paragraph .26 is supposed to enhance.
The Black & Decker Corporation 
701 East Joppa Road 
Towson, Maryland 21286 
410 716 3419 
Fax 410 716 3083 
email: steve.howarth@bdk.com
Steven E. Howarth
Vice President and General Auditor
  BIACK&DECKER
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ALSO SENT VIA E-MAIL
Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Reference: File 2280
Dear Ms. Boothe:
The Black & Decker Corporation appreciates the opportunity to respond to the Exposure Draft (ED), 
Proposed Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61 and No. 71.
Our comments are offered in light of management's continued focus on adequate, timely, and relevant 
communication with our Audit Committee by the Independent and Interna, Auditors, along with Senior 
Management as situations dictate.
Our comments on the issues raised in the ED follow. It should be noted that silence as to portions of 
the ED should not be viewed as acquiescence, rather prioritization of our comments.
Communication with Audit Committees
We encourage active communication between management, auditors and the audit committee. 
However, our view of an audit committee’s responsibility is to ensure the adequacy of a control frame­
work over financial reporting. This control framework should provide for communication with the 
committee over all types of risk involving business activities with financial reporting implications and 
significant judgments in the financial reporting process. As the audit committee is a committee of the 
board of directors, it has the authority and ability to make inquiries and requests of information from 
management and auditors alike. In that regard, we believe the promulgation of a standard which 
forces a limited communication of specified information may detract from the overall purpose of 
improving the audit committee function.
The proposed requirement for external auditor discussion of their judgement over quality of the 
company’s application of generally accepted accounting principles may dilute the objective evaluation 
required by current standards and add to the volatility of comments to the committees, as judgments 
over quality of broad applications of GAAP are likely to be unable to be defined. In providing 
guidance for application of GAAP, current standards allow for professional judgement in their
Ms. Sherry Boothe 
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application. No doubt, disparity exists within management and independent accountants as to their 
judgements. The added evaluation of “quality" would add to the subjectivity of reported information 
and may detract from the requirement for the external auditor to make overall judgements over the 
application of GAAP in the financial statements, taken as a whole.
We do believe that healthy discussions over new or revised applications of GAAP are of value to the 
audit committee. As a group (audit committee, management, internal and external audit) we often 
present and discuss views on these matters, however, we believe it is limiting and subjective to make 
an overall assertion of quality.
Furthermore, current professional standards allow for and encourage the adaptability of company 
policies within the guidelines of GAAP given economic and operational activities which are in constant 
evolution. The lack of guidance provided in this standard would allow for broad interpretation of 
subjective levels of “quality" and detract from the pertinent matter of application of generally accepted 
accounting principles which are quite clear on the differing accounting treatment and disclosure for 
changes in accounting principles and policies.
Furthermore, the ASB appears contradictory in this proposal, precluding written communication to the 
committee, significantly detracting from the effectiveness of the proposed process. Surely the ASB is 
recognizing the lack of objective criteria provided to management and auditors in making such an 
evaluation. For instance, in periods of personnel changes in senior members of independent auditors 
and management committee members, documented communications would provide the necessary 
background for continuity in such assessments. We question how this proposal could therefore add 
to the effectiveness of the audit committee.
Communications Related to Timely Quarterly Review
We believe open, meaningful dialogue among management, independent and internal auditors and 
the audit committee is critical to the effectiveness of the oversight of the financial reporting process. 
However, the proposed guidance suggesting that timely quarterly discussions would facilitate such 
discussion seems to reduce or change the significance of proactive activities at regular audit 
committee meetings and ignores the importance of open access to the committee by the external 
auditor throughout the audit process. We believe these forums currently provide opportunities for 
such discussion amongst all parties.
Therefore, we would encourage timely communication with the audit committee by the external 
auditor only when matters so dictate. Further, requiring communication on a positive (vs. negative) 
assurance basis may be misleading to the committee in light of the limited scope of interim reviews by 
the external auditor.
Should you have any questions or comments, please feel free to contact me.
Sincerely,
Steven E. Howarth
Vice President & Genera, Auditor
COMMENT LETTER #18
November 30, 1999
Virginia Society of 
Certified Public Accountants
Accounting and Auditing Procedures Committee 
5813 Hamlet Road
Virginia Beach, Virginia 23464
Office 757.683.3514 
FAX 757-683-5639
E-Mail dziegenf@odu.edu
Sherry Boothe,
Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards
File 2280
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Dear Sherry:
The Accounting and Auditing Committee of the Virginia Society of Certified Public 
Accountants offers the following comments concerning the AICPA Exposure Draft of a 
proposed Statement on Auditing Standards, “Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards 
No. 61, Communication with Audit Committees, and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71, 
Interim Financial Information.”
In general, we believe that this exposure draft is an excellent and comprehensive revision to 
those SASs incorporating the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Audit 
Committees. We have no substantive corrections or additions to the exposure draft. We 
recommend its adoption because we feel its provisions will strengthen the financial reporting 
process.
Thank you for this opportunity to comment on this exposure draft and we await the final 
version of the standard.
Sincerely,
Dr. Douglas E. Ziegenfuss, CPA 
Chair
 
COMMENT LETTER #19
With respect to the proposal in paragraph 11 regarding required communications regarding the 
quality of accounting principles, I believe the communications should be in writing and 
specific. The way this proposal is drafted, it appears to be a total "CYA" attempt on behalf of 
the CPA firms, without doing justice to the recommendations of Chairman Leavitt. The CPA 
firms are best positioned by getting as many of the potentially contentious issues on the table, 
in writing, to eliminate potential confusion or misunderstanding on the part of the audit 
committee and senior management. This proposal just validates the current smoke and mirrors 
shuffle being performed by the Big 5 firms in an attempt to maintain clients in the face of a 
deteriorating audit service offering at a time of increasing standards complexity.
At a recent financial reporting symposium in Chicago, I made the recommendation (with 
tongue only partly in cheek), which was greeted by gasps from the Big 5 representatives on the 
panel, that the traditional "Summary of Passed Adjustments" that is prepared by CPA firms 
during the course of the audit be filed as a schedule to the annual Form 10-K filing. The 
schedule could be referred to as supplemental information in the audit report (or covered by a 
separate statement) and management would have the opportunity to take exception to the 
schedule if they so chose.
The point that everyone is missing, including the SEC with the recent issuance of SAB 99, is 
that you cannot mandate morality in financial reporting. This proposed amendment to the 
SAS’s does nothing substantive to address the issues raised by the BRC and, in fact, puts the 
profession in a less defensible position with respect to the quality of its services. The 
profession and the investing public will always best served by making as much relevant and 
reliable information available as possible. By making the aforementioned information 
available, the public can then improve their own investing decisions, based in part on 
JUDGMENTS made by the CPA firms. Disclosing such information would also further the 
efforts to close the age-old "expectations gap", as the public would get a better appreciation of 
the types of JUDGMENTS that underpin the issuance of an opinion (read a JUDGMENT 
issued in writing) on a set of financial statements.
With the move to more of a real-time reporting model, the trend in the auditing profession 
should be in the direction of providing additional substantive information to the investing 
public and other users of audited financial statements. These proposed amendments appear to 
do more to support an auditor in a court of law when defending a claim of audit failure / 
negligence than to be a bona fide response to the BRC recommendations.
We as a profession can do better than this.
Sincerely,
Lawrence P. Brown - CPA
Chicago, Illinois
UW
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON
COMMENT LETTER # 20
Dr. Kathryn Kadous
Department of Accounting, Box 353200
University of Washington
Seattle, WA 98195-3200
November 30, 1999
Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attestation Standards, File 2280
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards: Amendments to SAS No. 61 and SAS No. 71
Dear Ms. Boothe:
Attached please find an academic research paper that provides empirical evidence regarding 
two issues in the above-referenced proposed auditing standard. The study uses an experimental 
methodology to assess the likely effectiveness of the proposals. Professional auditors from a 
Big Five accounting firm participated in the study.
Discussions about the Quality of Accounting Methods (Proposed amendments to SAS 
No. 61)
Data in our study provide no evidence that discussions between the auditor and the audit 
committee about the quality and appropriateness of earnings will mitigate against aggressive 
reporting. In our data, experienced auditors are more likely to identify a client-preferred, 
aggressive accounting method as the most appropriate method and are more likely deem it to 
be acceptable when pressure on the auditor to agree with the client is higher. Further, an 
explicit request that auditors evaluate the quality, not just the acceptability, of the client's 
preferred accounting method does not reduce, and sometimes elevates, the likelihood that 
auditors will deem an aggressive method to be acceptable. Please refer to the attached paper 
for details.
Pre-Announcement/Pre-Filing Reviews (Proposed amendments to SAS No. 71)
Our study indicates that earlier auditor involvement in a client firm's decisions about 
accounting methods likely will mitigate against aggressive financial reporting. Specifically, we 
find that experienced Big Five auditors are less likely to deem a client’s aggressive accounting 
method to be acceptable when the auditor is involved in management's decision making 
before, rather than after, quarterly statements have been released to the public and filed with
the SEC. This effect is attributed to the fact that late involvement with contentious issues puts 
pressure on the auditor to accept client-preferred accounting methods. Please refer to the 
attached paper for details.
Thank you for the opportunity to bring our study to your attention.
Sincerely,
Kathryn Kadous
Assistant Professor
Auditors1 Judgments of the Acceptability of Client-Preferred 
Accounting Methods
Kathryn Kadous*
Jane Kennedy*
Mark E. Peecher**
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November 30, 1999
Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards; File 2280
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, N.Y. 10036-8775
Re: Exposure Draft, Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61,
Communication With Audit Committees, and Statement on Auditing 
Standards No. 71, Interim Financial Information
Dear Ms. Boothe:
One of the objectives that the Council of the American Institute of CPAs established for the 
PCPS Executive Committee is to act as an advocate for all local and regional firms and 
represent those firms' interests on professional Issues, primarily through the Technical Issues 
Committee ("TIC"). This communication is in accordance with that objective.
TIC has reviewed the above referenced exposure draft and is providing the following 
comments and suggestions for your consideration.
General
The members of TIC appreciate having had the earlier opportunity to informally provide input 
regarding the appropriate scope of the anticipated exposure draft. TIC believes that the scope 
of the exposure draft as set forth in paragraph 11 is appropriate. TIC members agree that, as 
stated in the summary of the SAS No. 61 amendments, “the application of this requirement to 
non-SEC organizations that have audit committees may not be meaningful and cost-effective 
at this time.”
Part 1 - Paragraph 11
If adopted as proposed, paragraph 11 of SAS No. 61 would require the auditor to discuss with 
the audit committee the auditor’s judgments about the “quality,” not just the acceptability, of 
the entity’s accounting principles as applied in its financial reporting. That paragraph would 
also prohibit written communications of the auditor’s judgments because “objective criteria 
have not been developed to aid in the consistent evaluation of the quality of an entity’s 
accounting measurements and disclosures.”
Definition of “Quality”
TIC members are concerned that the “quality” of an entity’s accounting principles is not 
defined in today’s literature and that due to the lack of the objective criteria noted above, the 
proposed requirement will be difficult to apply and will not be operational.
The requirement to discuss “quality” seems to put the auditor in the position of “judging” 
generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”). Presumably, if accounting principles are 
in accordance with GAAP, they are acceptable. If they are not acceptable and the impact is 
material, this would result in an adjustment or a proposed adjustment that would be reported 
under the current SAS No. 61 requirements. Furthermore, TIC believes that if an auditor 
communicates to an entity’s audit committee that certain accounting principles, while 
acceptable, are of a “low quality,” that auditor may ultimately be exposed to increased liability 
should that entity fail.
The difficulty in applying the proposed requirement can be illustrated through an example of a 
hypothetical entity that sells only one product - metal “widgets.” Such an entity would have 
the option to select a first-in first-out (“FIFO”) or a last-in first-out (“LIFO”) cost flow 
assumption for its inventory valuation. FIFO and LIFO are both acceptable methods of 
accounting for inventory and all other things being equal, it is unclear whether one cost flow 
method would be of a “higher quality” versus the other method.
Written Communications
Given the various issues and concerns noted above, the members of TIC believe that the 
communications covered by paragraph 11 could be subject to misunderstanding or 
misinterpretation by audit committees. Consequently, TIC recommends that the auditor be 
given the option of documenting those communications in writing.
Part 2 - Paragraph 25
The proposed revision to paragraph 25 of SAS No. 71 would require auditors of SEC clients to 
consider whether any of the matters described in SAS No. 61, as they relate to interim 
financial information, have been identified. If so, the auditor should communicate them to the 
audit committee or be satisfied, through discussions with the audit committee, that such 
matters have been communicated to the audit committee by management.
Matters to be Communicated
TIC members believe that it is unclear whether the matters to be communicated pursuant to the 
revised paragraph 25 would include the “quality” of an entity’s accounting principles as 
contemplated by the proposed revisions to SAS No. 61. Consequently, TIC recommends that 
this issue be clarified.
We appreciate the opportunity to present these comments on behalf of PCPS member firms. 
We would be pleased to discuss our comments with you at your convenience.
Sincerely,
Candace Wright, Chair 
PCPS Technical Issues Committee
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November 30, 1999
RE: Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards: Amendments to Statements on 
Auditing Standards No. 61 Communications with Audit Committees and No. 71 
Interim Financial Information-File 2280
Sherry Boothe, Technical Manager
Audit and Attest Standards
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York NY 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Boothe,
The New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants is pleased to submit the 
attached comments on the proposed amendments to statements on auditing standards. 
The Society’s Auditing Standards and Procedures Committee developed the comments. 
We would be pleased to respond to questions you may have about the comments.
Very truly yours,
Vincent J. Love, CPA
Chair
Auditing Standards and Procedures Committee
cc: James L. Craig, Jr., Technical Services
Auditing Standards and Procedures Committee 
Accounting and Auditing Committee Chairs
NYSSCPA Committee on Auditing Standards and Procedures
Comments on the Exposure Draft
Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards 
Amendments to
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61 
Communications with Audit Committees 
And
Statement no Auditing Standards No. 71 
Interim Financial Information
The Auditing Standards and Procedures Committee of the New York State Society of Certified 
Public Accountants (the “Committee”) would like to thank the AICPA Auditing Standards Board 
(the “Board”) for this opportunity to comment on the Proposed Statement of Auditing Standards, 
Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61, Communications with Audit 
Committees, and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71, Interim Financial Information.
While we believe overall that the proposed amendments are appropriate, we question the timing 
of the Exposure Draft. Why not wait until the SEC issues the proposed rule(s) that are mentioned 
in the Exposure Draft as the genesis of the recommended changes. Of course, if the SEC issues 
its proposed rule(s) by the time the amendments are issued and the amendments properly address 
the proposed rule(s), this timing comment is moot.
As to the prohibition against any written communication with an entity’s audit committee 
concerning the quality of the entity’s accounting principles and underlying estimates in its 
financial statements, we believe the choice of communication media should be left to the auditor. 
The wording in the Exposure Draft should recommend that the communication be oral and not in 
writing to facilitate a more frank and open discussion, but it should not prohibit written 
communications.
The Committee greatly appreciates this opportunity to comment on the proposed amendments 
and hopes that its recommendations are helpful to the Board.
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November 30, 1999
Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2280 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS)—Comment Letter 
Amendments to SAS No. 61, Communication With Audit Committees 
and SAS No. 71, Interim Financial Information
Dear Ms. Boothe:
We are pleased to submit this comment letter to the Auditing Standards Board with 
regard to the Proposed SAS Amendments to SAS No. 61, Communications With Audit 
Committees and SAS No. 71, Interim Financial Information, and we are supportive of the 
issuance of this SAS. We have supported the efforts of the Blue Ribbon Committee on 
Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (BRC), and we also support 
the proposed changes to promptly implement the recommendations which apply to 
auditing standards.
We have the following recommendations to further improve the Exposure Draft:
1. We recommend that the wording in the amendments to SAS 61 revert to the 
“aggressive or conservative” wording recommended by the Blue Ribbon 
Committee.
2. We recommend the communication of the “quality, not just the acceptability, 
of the company’s accounting principles” be integrated with the existing 
communication requirements regarding accounting policies and estimates 
rather than added as a new item in the list.
3. The discussion contemplated by the amendments to SAS 61 would be 
appropriate as part of the annual communication with the audit committee of 
matters related to the conduct of the audit, but we do not believe it would be 
appropriate as part of a discussion resulting from a quarterly review. 
Accordingly, we recommend that the amendment state that this discussion 
need not apply to quarterly reviews.
4. We recommend that the amendments to SAS 71, as they relate to the 
importance of the timing of the discussion between the auditor and the audit 
committee, revert to the stated approach recommended by the Blue Ribbon 
Committee, that is that the matter be discussed “...prior to the filing of the
DEC-02-39 14:03 FROM:ERNST&YOUNG LLP ID:2165832034 PAGE 3Z7
Form 10-Q (and preferably prior to any public announcement of financial 
results)...”
Attached to this letter is a further discussion of each recommendation.
We would be pleased to discuss our comments with members of the Auditing Standards 
Board or its staff.
Sincerely,
Ernst & Young LLP
Attachments A & B
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ATTACHMENT A
Comments on Proposed SAS Amendments to SAS No. 61, 
Communications With Audit Committees
BRC Recommendation 8 states the following:
The Committee recommends that Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) require that a 
company's outside auditor discuss with the audit committee the auditor's judgments about the 
quality, not just the acceptability, of the company’s accounting principles as applied in its financial 
reporting; the discussion should include such issues as the clarity of the company’s financial 
disclosures and degree of aggressiveness or conservatism of the company’s accounting 
principles and underlying estimates and other significant decisions made by management in 
preparing the financial disclosure and reviewed by the outside auditors. This requirement should 
be written in a way to encourage open, frank discussion and to avoid boilerplate.
In response to this recommendation, the AICPA Auditing Standards Board developed an 
amendment to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61, Communication With Audit 
Committees, that would:
• require that the auditor discuss the auditor’s judgments about the quality, not just the 
acceptability, of the company’s accounting principles with the audit committees of 
SEC clients.
• require the discussion to include such matters as the consistency of application of the 
entity’s accounting policies and the clarity, consistency, and completeness of the 
entity's accounting information contained in the financial statements and related 
disclosures. The discussion is also to include certain items that have a significant 
impact on the representational faithfulness, verifiability, neutrality, and consistency 
of the accounting information included in the financial statements. Examples of 
items that may have such impact are the following:
- selection of new or changes to accounting policies
- estimates, judgments, and uncertainties
- unusual transactions
- accounting policies relating to significant financial statement items, including 
the timing of transactions and the period in which they are recorded
• encourage a three-way discussion among the auditor, management, and the audit 
committee.
• prohibit auditors from communicating in writing the auditor’s judgments.
In providing background on this recommendation, the BRC report described other 
required communications that presently exist in auditing standards (including matters 
such as disagreements with management, consultations with other accountants,
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difficulties in performing the audit, and reportable conditions). In contrast, the 
Committee report described the need for information on the more subjective judgments 
concerning estimates, elective accounting principles and new significant transactions, and 
the report recommended that the amendments to the standards be written in a way to 
encourage an open, frank discussion of such matters and to avoid boilerplate.
In developing the specific wording for the proposed amendments to SAS 61 to implement 
this recommendation, the Auditing Standards Board replaced the term “degree of 
aggressiveness or conservatism” with terms taken from FASB Concept Statement 2. This 
was done in the belief that such terms would facilitate a frank and open discussion 
because they were already reflected and defined in FASB literature as fundamental 
concepts underlying quality financial accounting and reporting and were already 
applicable to a company’s accounting policies. However, in using such technical 
terminology, the exposure draft of the amendments moves away from terms that are more 
commonly used—such as “aggressive” or “conservative” policies—and emphasizes terms 
that are less well understood—such as “representational faithfulness”. Although such 
technical terms are taken from FASB literature, using them as the basis for the 
communications described by the Blue Ribbon Committee report is not likely to facilitate 
an “open, frank discussion” between the auditor and audit committee.
Additionally, the amendments to SAS 61 make clear that management should be an 
active participant in the discussions. We concur with this change, but also believe that 
the inclusion of management along with the audit committee further increases the 
importance of using terminology in common usage such as “aggressive and 
conservative.”
Accordingly, we recommend that the wording in the amendments to SAS 61 revert to the 
“aggressive or conservative” wording recommended by the Blue Ribbon Committee.
Further, this amendment proposes adding this additional communication requirement as a 
new item in the list of items in SAS 61. However, the nature of this item overlaps 
existing communications already required, especially those regarding “significant 
accounting policies” (AU380.07) and “management judgements and accounting 
estimates” (AU380.08). We believe that the discussion of the quality of accounting 
principles should be conducted as a part of the discussion of significant accounting 
policies and estimates. Accordingly, we recommend the communication of the “quality, 
not just the acceptability, of the company’s accounting principles” be integrated with the 
existing communication requirements regarding accounting policies and estimates rather 
than added as a new item in the list.
Finally, the discussion contemplated by this amendment would be appropriate as part of 
the annual communication with the audit committee of matters related to the conduct of 
the audit, but we do not believe it would need to be part of a discussion resulting from a 
quarterly review. Accordingly, we recommend that the amendment state that this 
discussion need not apply to quarterly reviews.
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Comments on Proposed SAS Amendments to SAS No. 71, 
Interim Financial Information
BRC Recommendation 10 states the following:
The Committee recommends that the SEC require that a reporting company's outside auditor 
conduct a SAS 71 Interim Financial Review prior to the company's tiling of its Form 10-Q.
The Committee further recommends that SAS 71 be amended to require that a reporting 
company's outside auditor discuss with the audit committee, or at least its chairman, and a 
representative of financial management, in person, or by telephone conference call, the matters 
described in AU Section 380, Communications With the Audit Committee, prior to the tiling of the 
Form 10-Q (and preferably prior to any public announcement of financial results), including 
significant adjustments, management judgments and accounting estimates, significant new 
accounting policies and disagreements with management.
In response to this recommendation, the AICPA Auditing Standards Board developed an 
amendment to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71, Interim Financial Information, 
that would:
• clarify that the auditor should communicate to the audit committee those matters 
described in section 380, Communication With Audit Committees, when they have 
been identified in the conduct of interim financial reporting
• require an auditor of an SEC client to attempt to discuss with the audit committee the 
matters described in SAS No. 61 prior to the filing of the Form 10-Q
• require an auditor of an SEC client to attempt to have this discussion prior to the 
entity releasing interim financial information in a public announcement (if the 
announcement is made prior to the filing of Form 10-Q)
In providing background on this recommendation, the BRC recognized that the auditors’ 
ability to fulfill this requirement would be dependent on the cooperation and availability 
of financial management and the audit committee. In keeping with this reality, we agree 
with Auditing Standards Board’s insertion of the word ‘attempt’ into the amendment 
language.
Based on the BRC background discussion and the recommendation itself, we believe that 
the BRC’s primary intent was to require the involvement of the auditor in interim 
financial reporting “prior to the filing of the Form 10-Q (and preferably prior to any 
public announcement of financial results).” The proposed amendments to SAS 71 go 
beyond the BRC recommendation, as they put the importance of the timing of the 
discussion relative to the filing of the Form 10-Q and publication of financial results on 
an equal footing by stating that the discussion occur prior to the filing of the Form 10-Q 
and prior to any public announcement of financial results.
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An entity’s process for making a public announcement of financial results differs from 
the process for filing Form 10-Q. The process for filing Form 10-Q is typically more 
formal, and more involved, than the process for the public announcement of financial 
results. Accordingly, we recommend that the amendments to SAS 71, as they relate to 
the importance of the timing of the discussion between the auditor and the audit 
committee, revert to the stated approach recommended by the Blue Ribbon Committee.
Deloitte & 
Touche 
 Deloitte & Touche LLP Telephone: (203) 761-3000Ten Westport Road 
P.O. Box 820
Wilton, Connecticut 06897-0820
November 30, 1999
Ms. Kim Gibson
Audit and Attest Standards
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: File 2280
Dear Ms. Gibson:
We are pleased to comment on the Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards, Amendments to 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61, Communication with Audit Committees, and 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71, Interim Financial Information.
We fully support amending existing standards to adopt requirements directed toward 
improving the quality of communications with audit committees. We believe that the proposal 
is an important step forward in providing additional information that may assist audit 
committees in overseeing the financial reporting and disclosure process and thereby contribute 
to increasing the audit committee’s effectiveness. However, we believe that the prohibition on 
written communications to audit committees regarding the auditor’s judgments about the 
quality of the entity’s accounting practices and disclosures is not practicable for the reasons 
discussed in the attachment to this letter and should be deleted from the proposed standard. 
Also, we believe that additional guidance is needed concerning the communication of matters 
noted in a review of interim financial information as discussed in the attachment to this letter.
Additionally, we have some recommendations concerning the proposed standard’s effective 
date and several editorial comments for your consideration, as described in the attachment to 
this letter. Our recommended revisions to the proposed standard are shown in bold text and 
strike-through text.
Please contact Robert C. Steiner at (203) 761-3438 if you wish to discuss our comments. 
Sincerely,
Attachment
Deloitte Touche
Tohmatsu
#24
Attachment
Part 1, Amendment to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61
Paragraph 1
We strongly believe the prohibition on written communications to audit committees regarding 
the auditor’s judgments about the quality of the entity’s accounting practices and disclosures in 
the proposed standard is unworkable. Although we agree that an oral discussion with the audit 
committee will elicit more open and frank discussions, we also recognize that a written 
communication may be necessary or appropriate in certain situations. For example, if an audit 
committee is unwilling to engage in a discussion, the auditor would be unable to discharge his 
or her responsibility under generally accepted auditing standards unless a written 
communication is permitted. Also, an audit committee may request the auditor to render a 
written communication that summarizes the significant matters that were communicated 
orally—a request that the auditor may be unable to decline. Accordingly, we recommend that 
paragraph 3 of SAS No. 61 not be amended, as proposed, and that the prohibition against 
communicating in writing the matters discussed be deleted from the proposed standard.
We recommend that paragraph 11 be revised to read as follows:
11. In connection with each SEC engagement (see paragraph .01) 
the auditor should discuss with the audit committee the auditor's 
judgments about the quality, not just the acceptability, of the entity's 
accounting principles as applied in its financial reporting. Since the primary 
responsibility for establishing an entity's accounting principles rests with 
management, the discussion should generally would include management 
as an active participant. The discussion generally would should include 
such matters as the consistency of application of the entity's accounting 
policies and the clarity, consistency, and completeness of the entity's 
accounting information contained in the financial statements and related 
disclosures. The discussion would should also include items that have a 
significant impact on the representational faithfulness, verifiability, 
neutrality, and consistency4 of the accounting information included in the 
financial statements. Examples of items that may have such impact are 
the following:
• The critical elements of internal control that assure the effectiveness of 
the financial reporting process
• Selection of new or changes to accounting policies
• Estimates, judgments, and uncertainties
• Unusual transactions, including transactions with related parties
• Accounting policies relating to significant financial statement items, 
including the timing of transactions and the period in which they are 
recorded
• The adjustments proposed by the auditor that were not recorded and 
management's reasons for not recording them
4 The terms “representational faithfulness,” “verifiability,” “neutrality,” and “consistency” are 
discussed in FASB Statement of Concepts No. 2, “Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting 
Information,” paragraphs 63-64, 81-89, 98-110 and 120-122, respectively.
The discussion should be tailored to the entity's specific circumstances, 
including accounting applications and practices not explicitly addressed in 
the accounting literature, for example, those that may be unique to an 
industry. Objective criteria have not been developed to aid in the 
consistent evaluation of the quality of an entity's accounting 
measurements and disclosures. Given this lack of objective criteria and to 
facilitate an open and frank discussion, the auditor's judgments ordinarily 
should would be communicated orally not bo communicated in writing. If 
the communication is made orally,5a result the auditor need only 
document in the working papers that the discussion has taken place, the 
date of the discussion, and the participants.
5 [Old footnote 4 renumbered to footnote 5]
Part 2, Amendment to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71
Paragraph 3
We support the proposed requirement that the accountant communicate timely with the audit 
committee. Situations may arise wherein the audit committee may believe it unnecessary to 
have discussions with the accountant upon completion of the review. In those circumstances, 
we believe the accountant should cover those matters when making the communications 
specified by paragraph 6 through 16 of AU Section 380 (as amended) incidental to the annual 
audit. We recommend the addition to the proposed standard of guidance to that effect.
Additionally, we believe that clarification is needed with respect to the specific matters 
described in AU Section 380 that should be communicated to the audit committee arising out 
of a review of interim information. Certain of the matters discussed in AU Section 380, such 
as the auditors’ responsibility under GAAS and difficulties encountered in performing the 
audit are not applicable to reviews of quarterly information. In addition, the accountant’s 
responsibility for other information in documents containing interim information is addressed 
in AU Sections 722.33 and 550. Accordingly, we recommend that the proposed standard state 
that, to the extent applicable, the matters described in paragraphs 7 through 10, 13 and 14 of 
SAS No. 61 (as amended and renumbered by SAS No. 89 and Part 1 of this proposed standard) 
should be communicated to the audit committee as a result of the accountant having performed 
a review of interim financial information (i.e., significant accounting policies, management 
judgments and accounting estimates, audit adjustments that could have a significant effect on 
the entity’s financial reporting process, disagreements with management and consultations 
with other accountants).
Finally, we recommend that the proposed standard explicitly acknowledge, as AU Section 380 
does, that the communication may be written or oral, and if oral, that the accountant document 
the matters discussed by memorandum or other notation in the working papers.
Accordingly, we recommend paragraph 3 be revised to read as follows:
2
3. This amendment revises SAS No. 71 (AU sec. 722.25) and includes a new paragraph (AU 
sec. 722.26) to reflect recommendation number 10 of the Blue Ribbon Committee on 
Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees. It requires auditors of SEC 
clients to attempt to discuss with audit committees the matters described in SAS No. 61, 
paragraphs .07 through .10, .13 and .14, preferably prior to the filing of the Form 10-Q or, 
if applicable, prior to a public announcement of interim information. The new language is 
shown in boldface italics; deleted language is shown by strikethrough. [AU sec. 722.26-.44 
is renumbered 722.27-.45.]
.25 In performing the procedures in paragraphs .13 through .19, the 
accountant may identify should consider whether any of the matters described in 
paragraphs .07 through .10, .13 and .14 of section 380, Communication With 
Audit Committees, that as theyrelate to the interim financial information, have 
boon identified and that If such matters should be communicated to the audit 
committee. The accountant should communicate them to the audit committee or 
be satisfied, through discussions with the audit committee, that such matters 
have been communicated to the audit committee by management. For instance, 
the accountant should determine that the audit committee is informed about the 
process used by management in formulating particularly sensitive accounting 
estimates or about a change in a significant accounting policy affecting the 
interim financial information.
.26 When the accountant has conducted the review prior to the entity's 
filing of the interim financial information with a regulatory agency (such as the 
SEC), he or she should attempt to make such communications withcommunicate 
the matters noted to the audit committee, or at least its chairman, and a 
representative of financial management prior to such filing. If the entity intends to 
release interim financial information in a public announcement prior to such filing, 
the accountant should attempt to make such communications prior to such public 
announcement. If such communications are not made prior to the public 
announcement or filing, as applicable, because the audit committee does not 
wish to have a timely communication, they should be made as soon as 
practicable in the circumstances.8 The communications may be oral or written. If 
the matters are communicated orally, the accountant should document the 
matters communicated by appropriate memoranda or other notations in the 
review working papers.
8
If the audit committee does not wish to have a timely communication of matters relating to the 
interim financial information, the accountant should include communication of those matters in 
the communications specified by AU Section 380 in connection with the annual audit.
[Old footnotes 8-18 renumbered 9-19]
Paragraph 4
The SEC has proposed new rules that, if adopted, would require prefiling reviews of quarterly 
financial information and has sought input on a number of issues, the resolution of which 
could require further modification of AU Section 722. Those issues include whether a 
requirement that the review report be filed with the SEC be adopted, and whether the review 
report should set forth the scope of the review procedures performed. Accordingly, we believe 
the proposed standard should be issued only after analysis of the additional effects on AU
3
Section 722, if any, of the SEC’s final requirements for timely review of interim financial 
information.
It may be that the final standard cannot be issued any earlier than the first quarter of the 
calendar 2000, and considering the work loads of preparers and auditors during that time of 
year, we believe it would not be feasible to implement the requirements of Part 2 of the 
proposed standard for the first quarter of the calendar year 2000 (or even the second quarter, 
depending on the actual issuance date). We believe an effective date should be set for a year in 
which the standard may be first applied for all quarters. Accordingly, we recommend that the 
effective date for this part of the proposed standard be for interim periods in fiscal years 
beginning on or after June 15, 2000. However, we would not object to permitting earlier 
application, including mid-year adoption during calendar year 2000.
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AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775 
E-mail address: sboothe@aicpa.org 
Attention: Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards
Re: Proposed Amendments to Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 61, Communication With Audit Committees, 
and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71, Interim 
Financial Information (October 1, 1999)
File 2280
Ladies & Gentlemen:
The Committee on Securities Regulation of the Business Law Section of 
the New York State Bar Association appreciates the opportunity to 
comment on the AICPA’s proposed amendments to SAS 61 and SAS 71 
(the “Proposal”). The Proposal is in response to the recommendations 
made in the Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee 
on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees for 
implementation by the AICPA, the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
and stock exchanges.
The Committee on Securities Regulation is composed of members of the 
New York State Bar Association, a principal part of whose practice is in 
securities regulation. The Committee includes lawyers in private practice 
and in corporation law departments. A draft of this letter was circulated 
for comment among members of the Committee and the views expressed 
in this letter are generally consistent with those of the majority of the 
members who reviewed the letter in draft form. The views set forth in this 
letter, however, are those of the Committee and do not necessarily reflect 
the views of the organizations with which its members are associated, the 
New York State Bar Association, or its Business Law Section.
Do the Public Good • Volunteer for Pro Bono
A. General
The Proposal, together with related proposals of the Commission and the stock exchanges, are 
intended to make audit committees more effective. The Committee generally agrees with the 
Proposal, provided that the changes discussed below are made.
B. SAS 61 - Communication with Audit Committees.
The Proposal would require that the auditor’s discussion with the audit committee go beyond 
the acceptability of the company’s accounting principles and include various items relating to 
the auditor’s judgments about the “quality” of the company’s accounting principles.
The additional discussion would include: consistency of application of accounting policies; 
clarity, consistency and completeness of the accounting information; items that have a 
significant impact on the representational faithfulness, verifiability, neutrality, and consistency of 
the accounting information, such as selection of new or changes to accounting policies, 
estimates, judgments and uncertainties, unusual transactions, and accounting policies relating 
to significant financial statement items.
While we agree with most of the specific items to be discussed by the auditors with the audit 
committee where significant, we oppose the requirement to discuss the “quality” of the 
accounting principles because that term has no objective standards in the accounting literature.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) is the historically recognized standard, not 
“quality.” The Proposal itself even prohibits the auditor from communicating its judgments 
about “quality” in writing in order to facilitate an open and frank discussion and because of the 
lack of criteria. Therefore, we urge the AICPA to eliminate the requirement to discuss the 
“quality” not just the acceptability of the company’s accounting principles.
We are concerned that the “quality” proposal could lead to lawsuits and possible liability for 
audit committees and their members because they would be subject to a standard for financial 
statements that has no established meaning. This new potential for litigation and liability also 
could discourage qualified persons from serving on audit committees. The AICPA apparently 
recognizes this potential for increased liability insofar as auditors are concerned in the 
Proposal’s prohibition on auditors expressing judgments on “quality” in writing.
Finally, we urge that terms such as “clarity”, “neutrality” and “representational faithfulness” be 
deleted because they do not have a recognized objective meaning. Those terms, and “quality”, 
are based on a conceptual framework put out by FASB in 1980. While the average reader may 
think a discussion on “quality” somehow has to do with superiority or excellence, in the 
Concepts Statement the focus is on the qualities or characteristics of accounting information to 
be considered in developing accounting standards. The term “quality” and such other terms 
were not intended to be standards for the application of generally accepted accounting 
principles in a company’s financial reporting.
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information 
(May 1980).
C. SAS 71 - Interim Financial Information.
a. Discussion Regarding Interim Financials
SAS 71 presently requires the auditors to have SAS 61 discussions for annual audits. The 
Proposal would require SAS 61 discussions in connection with interim financials. Under the 
new Proposal, the auditor would have to communicate to the audit committee, or be satisfied 
through discussions with the audit committee, that management communicated to the 
committee any SAS 61 matters identified in the conduct of the interim financial review.
We agree with the proposal to require a discussion of SAS 61 information identified in 
connection with interim financial statements, provided that the SAS 61 information is modified in 
accordance with our comments to eliminate the requirement to discuss the “quality” of 
accounting principles and delete certain of the proposed items, as discussed above.
The major accounting firms are in most cases now requiring such reviews for new audit 
engagements. In addition, many large corporations already have SAS 61 type discussions with 
their auditors in connection with their interim financial statements. We believe that the Proposal 
will not add significantly to the burden and expense of auditor reviews for most companies, 
although some companies who do not now have SAS 71-type reviews on interim financial 
statements will face additional cost and delays in release of interim financial statements.
b. Transition Period
Finally, those companies who presently do not have SAS 71-type reviews for interim financials 
will need time to coordinate future audit committee meetings with the internal review timetables, 
establish procedures and make other necessary arrangements to implement the new 
requirements. Under the currently proposed effective date, the new requirements would apply 
to first calendar quarter 2000 interim financial statements for calendar year companies. This 
would not permit adequate time to implement the new requirements. Therefore, we 
recommend that the proposed effectiveness of the new requirements be extended one year.
c. Timing of Discussions Regarding Interim Financials
We agree that the independent auditor should discuss SAS 61 matters identified with respect to 
interim financial statements with the audit committee, or the chair of the committee, and 
company financial management prior to filing the Form 10-Q.
We also believe that some large companies already have SAS 61 discussions prior to public 
announcement of results. Those companies could apply the new requirements to public 
announcements without any significant burden or delay. However, the requirement could cause 
delays in earnings releases for other companies. Although we believe it is in a company’s own 
best interests to have the audit committee discussions prior to release of earnings, if 
practicable, we understand that will not work for some companies. Therefore, we recommend 
that the proposal delete the reference to discussions prior to public announcement.
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\Ne hope that you will find these comments helpful. We would be happy to meet with you to 
discuss these comments further.
Respectfully submitted,
COMMITTEE ON SECURITIES REGULATION
Guy P. Lander 
Chairman of the Committee
Drafting Committee:
Michael J. Holliday 
Gerald S. Backman 
Richard E. Gutman
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By:
Donald E. Kiernan
Senior Executive Vice President
and Chief Financial Officer
SBC Communications Inc. 
175 E. Houston Street 
San Antonio, Texas 78205 
Phone 210 351-2200
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November 29, 1999
Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards
File 2280
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Boothe:
We have reviewed the exposure drafts of amendments to Auditing Standards Nos. 
61 and 71.
We agree with the amendment to Auditing Standard No. 61, which would require 
the external auditor to discuss with management and the audit committee their 
judgments about the quality and consistency of the client’s accounting principles 
and completeness of accounting information. We believe that this is an 
appropriate amendment and that it is in the best interest of our shareholders.
However, we recommend that the Board reconsider the proposed amendment to 
Auditing Standard No. 71. The amendment would require the external auditor to 
discuss with the audit committee or its chairman certain matters that arise from a 
review of quarterly financial information prior to its public announcement. It is our 
belief that both management and the external auditor have specific responsibilities 
on these matters and dedicate appropriate resources in preparing and reviewing 
quarterly information. Further, we believe that both management and the external 
auditor are expected to inform the audit committee before the public release of 
interim financial results if there are any extraordinary issues or disagreements. As 
such, we believe that requiring the communications of quarterly financial 
information reviews prior to their release is not necessary.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the AlCPA’s proposed
amendments.
Sincerely,
SBC
#27
FLORIDA INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
325 WEST COLLEGE AVENUE • P.O. BOX 5437 • TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32314 
TELEPHONE (850) 224-2727 • FAX (850) 222-8190
November 23, 1999
Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2280
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
RE: Exposure Draft: Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61,
Communication with Audit Committees and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 
71, Interim Financial Information
Dear Ms. Boothe:
The Accounting Principles and Auditing Standards Committee of the Florida Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (the “Committee”) has reviewed and discussed the above 
referenced exposure draft. The Committee has the following comments regarding this 
exposure draft.
The Committee has some general concerns with these two proposed amendments. The 
first concern relates to the appearance that the amendments are shifting responsibility 
from management to the auditor. It is management’s responsibility to select appropriate 
accounting principles within generally accepted accounting principles and the auditor’s 
responsibility to report on the fairness of the financial statements. These proposed 
amendments appear to be shifting the burden for the selection of the accounting 
principles more toward the direction of the auditor.
The second concern relates to the vagueness of some of the terms used in the proposed 
amendments. The Committee had difficulty defining some of the terms such as 
representational faithfulness and consequently is unsure as to how to apply them in 
practice.
Lastly, the Committee has concerns over the evaluation of the “quality” of an entity’s 
accounting measurements and disclosures. Professional literature does not define the term 
quality. The Committee would like to see some authoritative guidance given as to how to 
define and measure quality.
As always, the Committee appreciates the opportunity to share our views and concerns 
and to comment on exposure drafts. Members of the Committee are available to discuss 
any questions you may have regarding this communication.
Sincerely,
 
Joy L. Gibson, CPA
Chairman
FICPA Committee on Accounting Principles and Auditing Standards
Committee members coordinating this response:
Joy L. Gibson, CPA
Robert T. Loverich, CPA
November 23, 1999
Chevron
Chevron Corporation
575 Market Street
San Francisco, CA 94105-2856
M. R. Klitten
Vice President, Finance
Mr. Jonathan G. Katz
Secretary
U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
450 Fifth Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20549-0609
COMMENT: PROPOSED RULE ON AUDIT COMMITTEE DISCLOSURE 
FILE No. S7-22-99
Dear Mr. Katz:
On behalf of Chevron Corporation, I appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Commission’s 
proposed rule on Audit Committee Disclosure.
The positions taken by the Commission in this proposal improve on the Blue Ribbon Committee’s 
recommendations in that they are clearer and more pragmatic. However, we wish to comment on two 
of the questions raised in the proposed rule.
Section III.A (Pre-Filing Review of Quarterly Financial Statements), discusses the independent 
auditor’s SAS 71 interim review. One specific question is:
“Should we require that interim reviews be completed prior to quarterly “earnings releases,” when 
a company releases to the public financial results before the Form 10-Q or 10-QSB is filed?”
We believe that it is very much in the interest of the investing public that companies disclose financial 
results as soon as possible, which is generally before the 10-Q can be completed. When Chevron 
releases earnings, we have completed a management review and our independent auditor has 
completed much—but not necessarily all—of its SAS 71 interim review. Holding back public 
disclosure of our interim financial results until the final completion of the SAS 71 review (and 
discussions with the audit committee or its chair) would not serve the public interest. Any 
unnecessary delay in dissemination of financial data would appear to run counter to the Commission’s 
public statements.
Consequently, we believe strongly that the SAS 71 interim review should be completed prior to the 
filing of the Form 10-Q, but not before the earnings press release is issued.
#28
Mr. Jonathan G. Katz 
November 23, 1999 
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Under Section III.E (Proposed Safe Harbors), the proposed rule acknowledges that
“...notwithstanding the audit committee’s critical oversight role of the financial reporting process and 
financial statements, management ultimately has responsibility for the company’s financial 
statements.” The paragraph goes on to outline how the safe harbors could be applied and we support 
this approach.
The paragraph that follows states:
“We request your comments on whether we should adopt these proposed liability “safe harbors” to 
cover the information disclosed under the proposed amendments. Is a safe harbor necessary?”
Although management is responsible for the financial statements, with review provided by the 
independent auditor, the expanded role of the audit committee could be misinterpreted as more than an 
oversight process. The safe harbor language is essential to the goals of frank and honest
communication. If audit committee members are concerned about capricious litigation, it could have 
the unintended effect of making them less effective. Moreover, given the importance of having the 
very best people serve on the audit committee, anything that acts as a deterrent to full participation 
would not further the interests of better financial controls and disclosure.
Therefore, our position is that safe harbors (as described in the second paragraph of Section III.E) 
should be applied to all required disclosures.
I appreciate this opportunity to comment.
Sincerely,
Attachments: Two (2) additional copies
cc: Ms. Sherry Boothe 
Audit and Attest Standards 
File 228
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
 ArthurAndersen
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December 6, 1999
Ms. Sherry Boothe 
Audit and Attest Standards 
File 2280
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Arthur Andersen LLP
33 West Monroe Street 
Chicago IL 60603-5385
Dear Ms. Boothe:
We are pleased to comment on the proposed amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards 
(SAS) No. 61, "Communication with Audit Committees," and SAS No. 71, "Interim Financial 
Information," which are the Auditing Standards Board's (ASB's) response to the
recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) on the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit 
Committees.
We are generally supportive of the efforts of the Blue Ribbon Committee and amendments 
proposed by the ASB. We believe the amendments proposed by the ASB will have a positive 
effect on the financial reporting process. Many have viewed Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) as giving companies the freedom to operate within generally accepted 
ranges. Historically, a company operating within the range of GAAP, or the accounting 
"fairway," is considered acceptable because by definition, no place on the fairway is of higher 
quality than any other point. Our experience indicates that most faulty financial reporting 
started out on the fairway but veered out of bounds over time. Looking at the direction of a 
company's reporting could provide an indication of potentially faulty reporting in the future. 
Discussion of reporting quality with the audit committee can identify potential problems before 
they occur, particularly when those discussions occur on a quarterly basis. Although generally 
supportive of the ASB's proposal, we suggest that the ASB clarify certain items, as discussed 
below.
SAS 61
We believe that the ASB has made improvements to the original recommendation suggested by 
the BRC, in particular the deletion of the terms aggressive and conservative. However, we still 
have some concerns with the proposal. We believe that management, audit committees and 
auditors need a common framework for assessing reporting quality. Absent that framework, 
there is a risk that the players will talk past each other with competing definitions of reporting
Arthur
Ms. Sherry Boothe 
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quality. We understand that the development of this framework will not be easy and will take 
some time. As a result, we support the ASB's current proposal as logical first step in the 
process. We strongly encourage the ASB and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
to provide further guidance in the future regarding an objective quality reporting framework. 
Once this framework is developed, we believe that the prohibition on communicating this 
discussion in writing should be deleted, as further discussed below.
With regard to the current wording of the proposal, we are also troubled that the proposal does 
not distinguish "quality" from "preferability." We suggest that the ASB address this issue in 
the final rules. At a minimum, we believe the ASB should add a footnote to the word "quality" 
that explains that "quality" does not carry the same meaning as "preferability," as the latter is 
used in Accounting Principles Bulletin No. 20.
The ASB acknowledges that "objective criteria have not been developed to aid in the consistent 
evaluation of the quality of an entity's accounting measurements and disclosures." For this 
reason, the ASB prohibits the auditor from communicating this quality discussion in writing.
We agree that a written communication should never take the place of the discussion with the 
audit committee. The intent of the BRC's recommendation was to encourage an open and frank 
discussion regarding the subjective nature of a company's financial reporting. This could not be 
achieved through a one-way written communication. Nevertheless, we are troubled by a 
prohibition on summarizing the nature of the discussion in writing after the meeting has 
occurred. We foresee audit committees requesting such a summary and believe it would place 
auditors in an awkward position to refuse such a request. In addition, if a framework were 
developed by the ASB and FASB in the future, we believe this prohibition should be deleted 
altogether. We also suggest that a sentence be added to the proposal instructing the auditor to 
carefully review any minutes or other writings resulting from the meeting prepared by the 
audit committee or management to ensure that the writings are consistent with the auditors' 
understanding of what was communicated.
While the ASB attempted to provide examples of matters to be discussed with audit
committees, we observe that many of these examples are matters already required to be 
discussed with audit committees. The current text of AU Section 380 requires discussion with 
audit committees concerning the selection of accounting policies, estimates and judgements. It 
is unclear whether the ASB had something different in mind by repeating these aspects of the 
required communication. In addition, we also note that proposed wording of the amendment 
discusses the "consistency of the entity's accounting information contained in the financial 
statements" twice. It is unclear whether the ASB had two different thoughts in mind, whether 
it was emphasizing consistency or whether the repetition was an oversight. We suggest that 
each of these items be clarified in the final amendment.
ANDERSEN
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The ASB's proposal indicates that the quality reporting discussion would generally include 
management as an active participant. However, the wording proposed by the ASB could be 
interpreted to mean that the auditor should not have this discussion privately with the audit 
committee if the Committee so requests. We agree that that the ideal approach is to involve 
management, auditors and the audit committee in the discussion. The interaction of all the 
parties helps to assure that all relevant information is considered in the discussion. However, 
we see no basis for refusing a request by an audit committee to have this discussion without 
management. In fact, there may be circumstances where it is appropriate to conduct this 
discussion privately. We do not believe that the auditing profession is in a position to tell the 
audit committee how to execute their responsibility. As a result, we recommend that the ASB 
delete this sentence or clarify in the final amendment that auditors are not precluded from 
having this discussion privately with the audit committee.
SAS 71
We agree with the general concept of auditors communicating with audit committees prior to 
the public release of interim results and prior to the filing of interim results with a regulator 
agency (e.g. Form 10-Q filed with the SEC). We would like to point out, however, that this 
practice is inconsistent with the current requirement regarding communications for annual 
audit results. In fact, paragraph 4 of AU Section 380 specifically states that auditors are not 
required to communicate the results of the audit with the audit committee prior to the filing of 
the financial statements. We recommend that ASB require this communication with the audit 
committees prior to the filing of the annual financial statements and prior to the public release 
of the annual results. In fact, given the higher level of assurance associated with the annual 
audited information, it would seem to be even more important to communicate with audit 
committees prior to the release of annual information.
We would be please to discuss any of our comments with you or your staff at your convenience. 
If you have any questions, please contact Dorsey Baskin at 312-931-2238.
Very truly yours,
Arthur
Andersen
AICPA
December 14, 1999
File Ref. Nos. 1120 
2280
To the Auditing Standards Board:
Here are the comment letters received to date on the proposed Statement on Auditing 
Standards, Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61, Communication 
with Audit Committees, and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71, Interim Financial 
Information.
Name/Affiliation Location
30. Jacob A. Azar, CPA, Chairman 
Massachusetts Society of
Certified Public Accountants, Inc. Boston, MA
31. Loretta V. Cangialosi
Pfizer Inc. New York, NY
32. Margaret M. Foran
Michael J. Holliday
Kathleen A. Weigand
American Society of Corporate
Secretaries, Inc. New York, NY
33. Susan Koski-Grafer
Financial Executives Institute Morristown, NJ
34. KPMG LLP New York, NY
35. Kathy A. Asbeck
Coming Incorporated Coming, NY
If you have any questions, please call me at 212/596-6026.
Sincerely,
 
Kim Gibson
Technical Manager 
Audit and Attest Standards
Enclosures
cc: Audit Committee Effectiveness Task Force
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036-8775 • (212) 596-6200 • fax (212) 596-6213 • www.aicpa.org 
ISO9001 Certified
The  CPA. . Never Underestimate The Value.®
Massachusetts Society of
Certified Public Accountants, Inc.
Educational Foundation 105 Chauncy Street • Boston, Massachusetts 02111
November 30, 1999
Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards - AICPA 
File 2280
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: Exposure Draft Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards - “Amendments
to SAS No. 61 and No. 71”
Dear Ms. Boothe:
The Accounting Principles and Auditing Procedures Committee is the senior technical 
committee of the Massachusetts Society of Certified Public Accountants. The Committee 
consists of over thirty members who are affiliated with public accounting firms of various 
sizes, from sole proprietorships to international “big five” firms, as well as members in 
both industry and academia. The Committee has reviewed and discussed the above- 
mentioned Exposure Draft. The views expressed in this comment letter are solely those 
of the Committee and do not reflect the views of the organizations with which the 
Committee members are affiliated.
In response to the proposed amendments to SAS No. 61, we have concerns regarding the 
use of the word “quality” within this document and the proposed requirements that we 
speak to a degree of quality of accounting principles applied. The acceptability of 
accounting principles applied in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles is not subject to a quality assessment. We already have guidelines pertaining 
to possible alternatives under GAAP, and that entities should follow “preferable” 
methods of GAAP if there is more than one alternative. In other words, GAAP is GAAP 
and any principle applied, which is outside of the scope of generally accepted accounting 
principles is, in fact, not acceptable.
6 1 7.556.4000 • Fax 617.556.4 1 26 • Toll Free 1.800.392.61 45 
www.MSCPAonline.org • E-mail: MSCPA@MSCPAonline.org
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105 Chauncy Street • Boston, Massachusetts 02111
In regards to the requirement under the proposed amendments to SAS No. 71, we have 
significant concern over the possible misinterpretation as to the scope of the quarterly 
review required under SAS No. 71. Additionally, we suggest that consideration be given 
to the additional costs to the registrant resulting from such meetings, keeping in mind that 
these communications are already required under SAS No. 61 on an annual basis. 
Finally, we have concern in regards to the time constraints placed upon the proposed 
quarterly communications and suggest that the requirements that such communications 
take place before the press release puts undue pressure on the process of timely issuance 
of quarterly information.
We appreciate the opportunity to present our comments and thank you for your 
consideration.
Very truly yours,
 Jacob A. Azar, CPA, Chairman 
Accounting Principles and Auditing 
Procedures Committee
i
Massachusetts Society of Certified Public 
Accountants
6 1 7.556.4000 • Fax 6 1 7.556.41 26 • Toll Free 1.800.392.61 45
www.MSCPAonline.org • E-moil: MSCPA@MSCPAonline.org
Corporate Finance
Pfizer Inc
235 East 42nd Street
New York, NY 10017-5755
Tel 212 573 3222 Fax 212 338 1815
Email loretta.v.cangialosi@pfizer.com
November 30, 1999
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
Loretta Cangialosi
Vice President and Controller 
Accounting Services
New York, New York 10036-8775
Attention: Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards
Re: File 2280
Ladies and Gentlemen:
Thank you for allowing Pfizer the opportunity to respond to the Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards 
“Amendments to SAS 61, Communication with Audit Committees and SAS 71, Interim Financial Information.”
Pfizer is a research-based global pharmaceutical company that discovers, develops, manufactures, and markets 
innovative medicines for humans and animals. For 1998, total revenues and assets exceeded $13 billion and $18 
billion, respectively.
Part 1 Communication with Audit Committees - While our comments in the attached response will more completely 
express our views, in summary, we do not support the recommendations contained in Part 1 concerning 
communications with the audit committee. We believe strongly that the auditor’s judgments should be restricted to 
issues of ‘acceptability.’ However, in recognition of the concerns expressed by the SEC and the AICPA, we have 
proposed an alternative solution that would permit the auditor to hold these proposed discussions, but only under 
certain very restrictive circumstances.
Part 2 Interim Financial Information - We support the recommendations contained in Part 2 concerning interim
financial statements, and have, in fact, already instituted such a process for Pfizer’s interim financial statements. 
We would be happy to discuss our views with your staff.
Respectfully,
J
Loretta V. Cangialosi 
Vice President and Controller 
Pfizer Inc
Enclosure (1)
cc: Mr. David Shedlarz
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Pfizer Inc
Response to the Auditing Standards Board regarding the 
Exposure Draft on Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards 
“Amendments to SAS 61, Communication with Audit Committees and SAS 71, Interim 
Financial Information”
Part 1 - Communication with Audit Committees
Following are the recommendations contained in this part of the proposed Statement on Auditing 
Standards (SAS):
Auditor’s Judgments About the Quality of the Entity’s Accounting Principles: In
connection with each SEC engagement the auditor should discuss with the audit 
committee the auditor’s judgments about the quality, not just the acceptability, of 
the entity’s accounting principles as applied in its financial reporting. Since the 
primary responsibility for establishing an entity’s accounting principles rests with 
management, the discussion generally would include management as an active 
participant. The discussion should include such matters as the consistency of 
application of the entity’s accounting policies and the clarity, consistency, and 
completeness of the entity’s accounting information contained in the financial 
statements and related disclosures. The discussion should also include items that 
have a significant impact on the representational faithfulness, verifiability, 
neutrality, and consistency of the accounting information included in the financial 
statements. Examples of items that may have such impact are the following:
Selection of new or changes to accounting policies 
Estimates, judgments and uncertainties 
Unusual transactions
Accounting policies relating to significant financial statement items, including 
the timing of transactions and the period in which they are recorded
The discussion should be tailored to the entity’s specific circumstances, including 
accounting applications and practices not explicitly addressed in the accounting 
literature, for example, those that may be unique to an industry. Objective criteria 
have not been developed to aid in the consistent evaluation of the quality of an 
entity’s accounting measurements and disclosures. Given this lack of objective 
criteria and to facilitate an open and frank discussion, the auditor’s judgments 
should not be communicated in writing. As a result, the auditor need only 
document in the working papers that the discussion has taken place, the date of 
the discussion, and the participants.
General
We note that management is responsible for the fair presentation of the financial statements and 
while that the auditor is responsible for expressing an opinion on the fair presentation of the 
financial statements taken as a whole. We are generally concerned with proposals that threaten 
this division of established responsibility. As such, we believe that continues to be appropriate for 
auditors to be restricted to issues that affect fair presentation only; in other words, issues of 
‘acceptability.’
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However, we understand and agree with the concerns expressed by the Chairman of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission- - that there are registrants who abuse, and have abused, 
acceptable accounting and disclosure practices even within the confines of Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP). It is with respect to those concerns that we appreciate the 
motivation behind this proposed SAS.
Notwithstanding those motives, we also know that there is no evidence that suggests that ‘audit 
failures’ result from acceptable accounting principles being applied in a company’s financial 
reporting. Absent fraud, audit failures occur as a result of unacceptable accounting principles 
being applied in a company’s financial reporting. For this reason, we believe that the auditors 
should focus their efforts on issues of acceptability.’
Further, while the proposed SAS would require that these conversations become a part of the 
routine audit process, we believe that these conversations should deal with abuse only. The 
recommendations of the Auditing Standards Board (ASB or the Board) unnecessarily 
compromise the division of responsibility between management and the auditor. We believe that, 
except under the most restrictive of circumstances, the auditor should focus his attention on 
matters of acceptability and allow management to focus on policy.
Concerns about inherent subjectivity
The proposed SAS requires a discussion about the “quality, not just the acceptability” of 
accounting principles as applied in the company’s financial reporting. Discussions about the 
‘quality' of anything are, by nature, highly judgmental. These conversations would be inherently 
subjective and variable.
We believe that the ASB recognizes, to a degree, this fact, as it states that “objective criteria have 
not been developed to aid in the consistent evaluation of the quality of an entity’s accounting 
measurement and disclosures.” We believe that the ASB hasn’t developed objective criteria 
because it simply cannot be done. The content and nature of these discussions will depend on the 
facts and circumstances of each individual situation and will likely be highly influenced by the 
personalities and experiences of the auditor and the members of the audit committee. These 
concerns, coupled with the fact that management is responsible for the fair presentation of the 
financial statements, cause us to believe that these conversations, as envisioned by the proposed 
SAS, are inappropriate.
Equally disturbing to us is the fact that in response to these concerns and difficulties about 
subjectivity, the ASB has concluded, “the auditor’s judgments should not be communicated in 
writing.” Moreover, on October 6, 1999, the Securities and Exchange Commission proposed 
rules that would require companies to include in their proxy statements a report from the audit 
committee to state that the committee is not aware of any material modifications to the financial 
statements that are necessary. We believe that this approach of oral communication will only 
serve to make the required communications mysterious in addition to variable and inappropriate. 
Concerns about management’s authority
As stated, we are generally and increasingly concerned about proposals that threaten 
management’s authority over the financial statements. While this authority is bounded by GAAP, 
there is still tremendous decision-making latitude inherent in a set of financial statements— from
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the selection of accounting policies to the development of estimates and assumptions that affect 
reported amounts and disclosures. This is clearly identified in the ‘summary of significant 
accounting policies’ included in the footnotes to financial statements. Management bears this 
responsibility and must be free to exercise it. In fact, no one else is in a better position to make 
these decisions.
Even assuming that the auditor has deemed management’s decisions ‘acceptable,’ and that the 
auditor can render a clean opinion, the proposed SAS would require the auditor to take an 
additional step, and render another annual opinion (to the audit committee) about the “quality” of 
management’s decisions. These ‘routine conversations’ will serve to undercut the authority of 
management and to further triangulate the audit process even in situations where there is no 
documented abuse. This routine challenge to management’s authority is not necessary or 
prudent.
Alternative Proposal
As we see it, there are two competing objectives that must be achieved: (1) safeguard 
management’s authority over the financial statements and (2) safeguard high quality financial 
reporting. To accomplish both objectives, we believe that the auditor’s judgments about the 
quality of management’s decision should be rendered to the audit committee only in the most 
egregious of circumstances— that is, circumstances in which there is a compelling, documented 
history of abuse. As such, these conversations should not be held as a routine part of the audit. 
Further, we recommend that, when and if such conversations take place, the auditor be required 
to present these judgments in writing.
A requirement that the judgments be presented in writing will put tremendous pressure on the 
auditor to ensure that those judgments that are communicated to the audit committee are fully 
supported by the most objective means available. Before communicating negative judgments 
about the quality of management’s decisions, the auditor will have to ensure that there is 
compelling evidence of a recurring pattern of ‘poor quality’ decision-making. And, that such a 
pattern can be documented. Further, we believe that the requirement of a written document will 
ensure that the judgments of a sole auditor will not prevail. The documentation will have to be 
sufficient to convince the primary engagement team as well as the concurring partner.
While we understand that the ASB wants to encourage open and frank discussion, we want to 
ensure that such discussions are particularly focused on substantively abusive cases and that the 
conversations, if held, are serious, deliberate, supported, and put in writing.
Our objectives in placing such judgments into written form are to ensure that these 
communications are not impulsive and to protect management, the auditor and the audit 
committee from any misunderstandings in the future about what was communicated and when. 
This assurance will become especially important if the SEC approves its recently proposed rules 
that will require the audit committee to communicate in writing to the shareholders that 
discussions have taken place with the auditor.
Conclusion
Based on the above, we cannot support the provisions of Part 1 Communications with Audit 
Committees as presented. Management must maintain its clear responsibility for the financial
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statements, within the confines of GAAP, and auditors should be restricted to matters of 
acceptability only, which is their assigned role under SAS No. 1. Conversations about the ‘quality’ 
of management’s decisions should not become a routine aspect of the audit process because of 
the detrimental impact such conversations will have on the actual and perceived authority of 
management over the financial statements.
The impact of the proposal as drafted will have the auditors become de facto advisors to the audit 
committee on what are the appropriate acceptable policies that should be followed by the 
company. This contemplated role is clearly outside the boundaries of what an auditor has been 
engaged to do. We refer to AU Section 110.02 which states that “[rnjanagement is responsible for 
adopting sound accounting policies ...” and “[t]he independent auditor may make suggestions 
about the form or content of the financial statements... based on information from management’s 
accounting system. However, the auditor’s responsibility for the financial statements he has 
audited is confined to the expression of his opinion on them.” We also concerned about the 
proposal usurping the ability of management to select practices if audit committees attempt to 
limit liability or limit potential negative discussions by having the auditors select the policies to be 
used in the preparation of the financial statements. Please understand that we are not attempting 
to be alarmist in this regard as we have heard of law firms advising audit committees to not accept 
any waived adjustments in order to avoid any Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 issues.
We believe that such conversations should only occur only in cases where there is a compelling 
history of abuse. Further, if and when the conversations do occur, they should be documented in 
writing for the protection of management, the auditor and the audit committee.
Part 2- Interim Financial Information
Following are the recommendations contained in this part:
When the accountant has conducted the review prior to the entity’s filing of the interim 
financial information with a regulatory agency (such as the SEC), he or she should 
attempt to make such communications with the audit committee, or at least its chairman, 
and a representative of financial management prior to such filing. If the entity intends to 
release interim financial information in a public announcement prior to such filing, the 
accountant should attempt to make such communications prior to such public 
announcement. If such communications are not made prior to the public announcement 
or filing, as applicable, they should be made as soon as practicable in the circumstances.
We agree with the proposal as presented and, in fact, have already adopted a similar policy at 
Pfizer.
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AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CORPORATE SECRETARIES, INC. 
521 Fifth Avenue 
New York, New York 10175
December 8, 1999
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775 
E-mail address: sboothe@aicpa.org 
Attention: Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards
Re: Proposed Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61,
Communication With Audit Committees, and Statement on Auditing 
Standards No. 71, Interim Financial Information (October 1, 1999)
File 2280
Ladies and Gentlemen:
The Securities Law Committee of the American Society of Corporate Secretaries (the 
“Society”) is pleased to provide comments to the AICPA on its proposed amendments to 
SAS 61 and SAS 71 (the “Proposal”). The Society, with more than 4,000 members, 
represents over 2,700 public companies. We believe that our members, who serve as 
the interface between management, the company’s directors and its shareholders, are 
in a unique position to provide insight and discerning perspectives on the issues raised 
in the Proposal.
The Proposal arises out of the Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon 
Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (“BRC 
Recommendations”), and are part of a three-pronged approach for implementation 
by the AICPA, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and stock exchanges.
The Proposal, plus the separate, companion rule proposals of the Commission and 
the stock exchanges, represent an ambitious undertaking to implement the BRC 
Recommendations. The general stated objective to make audit committees more 
effective is one that the Society and its members can support. Our comments are 
directed to how to best accomplish that objective.
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1. SAS 61 - Communication with Audit Committees.
The proposal would add a requirement that the auditor discuss the following 
information relating to the auditor’s judgments about the “quality,” not just the 
acceptability, of the company’s accounting principles with the audit committee, 
including matters such as:
a. consistency of application of accounting policies
b. clarity, consistency and completeness of the accounting information 
contained in the financial statements and related disclosures
c. items that have a significant impact on the representational 
faithfulness, verifiability, neutrality, and consistency of the 
accounting information included in the financial statements, 
including, for example:
i. selection of new or changes to accounting policies
ii. estimates, judgments and uncertainties
iii. unusual transactions
iv. accounting policies relating to significant financial
statement items, including the timing of transactions and 
the period in which they are recorded
Auditors would be prohibited from communicating in writing the above judgments. 
The discussion would be documented in the audit working papers.
The Society does not oppose specificity about items to be discussed by the auditors with 
the audit committee, provided that the items are related to the application of 
accounting principles to the company’s financial reporting, and have an objective 
meaning with established standards. For example, the Society agrees with discussion 
about:
• consistency of application of accounting policies
• consistency and completeness of accounting information
• the following items where they have a significant effect on the 
financial statements:
selection of new or changes to accounting policies 
estimates, judgments and uncertainties 
unusual transactions
• accounting policies relating to significant financial statement 
items, including the timing of transactions and the period in which 
they are recorded
The Society, however, strongly opposes the requirement to discuss the “quality” not just 
the acceptability of the company’s accounting principles. Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) is the historically recognized standard for Generally
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Accepted Auditing Standards and financial statement reporting . The Proposal would 
introduce “quality” and other theoretical concepts that were intended to be tools to 
guide the Financial Accounting Standards Board in developing accounting and 
reporting standards.* The concepts have no established objective standards. The 
AICPA itself recognizes in the Proposal that there are no objective criteria for “quality.” 
In fact, in part because of the lack of criteria, the Proposal prohibits the auditor from 
communicating its judgments about “quality” in writing. In light of this, there can be 
no valid basis to subject companies and their audit committees to a requirement to 
discuss, and possibly be subject to, claims that they are responsible for, non-existent 
standards for financial statements. This aspect of the Proposal, if adopted, can only 
have the effect of creating potential litigation and liability, and discouraging qualified 
directors from serving on audit committees.
Accordingly, we urge that the words “the auditor’s judgments about the quality, not 
just the acceptability, of’ and the terms “clarity,” “representational faithfulness,” and 
“neutrality” be deleted from proposed subsection .11 of SAS 61 (AU sec. 380.11). 
Finally, if the above changes are made, the last three sentences of proposed subsection 
.11, dealing with the lack of objective criteria and the prohibition on written 
communications, would appear unnecessary and can be deleted.
2. SAS 71 - Interim Financial Information.
SAS 71 would be amended to require* the auditors to have the SAS 61 discussions 
(presently required only for annual audits) in connection with a review of interim 
financials. Specifically,
a. SAS 61 Discussion. The auditor would have to communicate to the audit 
committee, or be satisfied through discussions with the audit committee 
that management communicated to the committee, matters described in 
SAS 61 that have been identified in the conduct of the interim financial 
review.
We generally support the proposal requiring a discussion of SAS 61 information that 
has been identified related to interim financial statements, but only if the content and 
extent of the SAS 61 information does not expand beyond the current Proposal modified
* Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting 
Information (May 1980).
* We note that SAS 71 as proposed to be amended appears to require auditor review prior to filing 
the Form 10-Q (or 10-QSR), only if any SAS 61 items are identified. In other words, if the company 
chooses to have its auditors do a SAS 61 review for the interim financial statements as well as the 
annual financials, then the auditors would be required to attempt to have a SAS 71 discussion prior 
to filing the form 10-Q. However, if the SEC’s companion proposals (Release No. 34-41987; October 
7, 1999) are adopted as proposed, SEC-reporting companies would be required to have the SAS 71 
discussion/review prior to filing the Form 10-Q (or 10-QSB).
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in accordance with our comments above, including elimination of the requirement to 
discuss the “quality” of accounting principles.
We believe that such discussions can be helpful in ensuring that quarterly financial 
statements are reliable and credible. Interim reviews also can relieve some of the 
burden and time pressure of the year-end audit, as auditors will already be conversant 
with many of the significant issues expected to arise on the year-end audit.
Many of our larger corporate members already engage in SAS 61 type discussions with 
their auditors in connection with their interim financial statements. For those 
companies, the proposed SAS 71 requirement for interim SAS 61 discussions should not 
introduce any significant cost increases or other burdens.
In addition, we understand that the major accounting firms are in most cases now 
requiring such reviews as a condition to acceptance of new audit engagements. Thus, 
for many companies, the proposal will not add significantly to the burden and expense 
of auditor reviews. For those companies whose auditors do not now perform SAS 61- 
type reviews on interim financial statements, it should be recognized that the 
requirement will add additional cost and delays in release of interim financial 
statements.
In trying to devise a proposal that would provide the benefits of interim discussions 
without unduly burdening those companies who presently do not have such a 
procedure, we believe the best approach would be to defer the effectiveness of the 
proposed amendment to SAS 71 to interim periods in fiscal years ending on or after 
December 15, 2001. Earlier application should, of course, be permitted and 
recommended. This would allow one year for the companies to develop procedures, 
schedule audit committee meetings, establish internal review timetables, and make the 
other necessary arrangements to implement the new requirements. In any event, the 
currently proposed effective date would apply to first calendar quarter 2000 interim 
financial statements for calendar year companies, a very tight time period under the 
best of circumstances. Finally, the AICPA should consider an exemption or extended 
phase-in period for small businesses.
b. Timing of Interim Financial Review Discussions. The auditor would be 
required to attempt to discuss the SAS 61 matters with the audit committee 
or at least the committee chairperson, and a representative of financial 
management, prior to the filing of the Form 10-Q and, if possible, prior to a 
public announcement of interim financial results.
We support the principles that the independent auditor have timely access to the audit 
committee, or at least the chair of the committee, and company financial management to 
discuss SAS 61 matters identified with respect to interim financial statements prior to 
filing the Form 10-Q or 10-QSB. We have some concerns, however, with the proposed 
amendment to SAS 71, particularly as it applies to public announcements of interim 
results.
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With respect to SAS 61 discussions prior to public announcement of results, we believe that 
some of our larger company’s members already have such discussions. The new 
requirement would not impose any significant burden or delay on them. With respect to 
other companies, the requirement could lead to delays in earnings releases which work to 
the disadvantage of investors and create the conditions under which inadvertent leaks may 
occur. While it is preferable to have the audit committee discussions prior to release of 
earnings, it may not be practicable for some companies for a variety of reasons. Among 
other things, many companies may not have their full financial statements completed at 
the time they announce earnings. The Society proposes that the requirement regarding 
discussions prior to public announcement be modified to be a recommended best practice, 
and that SAS 61 clarify that companies are not required to delay the timing of their 
earnings releases or take on additional burdens in order to have the discussion with the 
audit committee (or chair) prior to the release of earnings.
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The Society appreciates this opportunity to comment on the Proposal. Please let us know if 
you have any questions on our views.
Sincerely,
/s/ MARGARET M. FORAN
Margaret M. Foran 
Chair
Securities Law Committee
/s/ MICHAEL J. HOLLIDAY
Michael J. Holliday
Co-Chair
Corporate Audit Committee Task Force
/s/ KATHLEEN A. WEIGAND
Kathleen A. Weigand
Co-Chair
Corporate Audit Committee Task Force
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December 10 1999
Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Reference: File 2280
Dear Ms. Boothe:
The Committee on Corporate Reporting (CCR) of the Financial Executives Institute 
appreciates the opportunity to respond to the Exposure Draft, Proposed Statement on 
Auditing Standards Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61, 
Communication With Audit Committees, and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71, 
Interim Financial Information. FEI has long been a supporter of high quality financial 
reporting and of informed and vigilant audit committees.
CCR has two general comments with regard to the exposure draft. First, it is difficult to 
assess the necessity of the actions this ED proposes because any subsequent review of 
effectiveness will be virtually impossible. While the Blue Ribbon Committee (“BRC”) 
made no case to establish a causal relationship between the problem and the proposed 
solution, CCR believes that the Auditing Standards Board (ASB), as the auditing 
governing body, should have a higher justification standard for issuing new procedures. 
The ASB has an obligation to issue only relevant standards.
Consider, for example, the proposal to have the auditor attempt to discuss with the audit 
committee the matters described in SAS No. 61 prior to the filing of the Form 10-Q or, if 
applicable, prior to a public announcement of interim financial reporting. For this to be a 
relevant standard, one needs to believe that a reason audit committees arc ineffective is 
that auditors arc aware of information about material misstatements of interim financial 
information and that they choose to keep it from the audit committee or are prohibited 
from bringing it to them. CCR is hard pressed to believe that either scenario is a 
prevalent problem that necessitates this solution. If the real issue is that some auditors 
may lack the independence to surface material problems within the communication 
framework in existing auditing standards or lack the competence to distinguish material 
from immaterial issues, then a different solution is required. Again, the exposure draft 
requires more transparency into the ASB’s notions of how this proposal accomplishes the 
objective of improved governance set out by the BRC.
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The second general comment relates to mandating best practices in a one-sizc-fits-all 
approach, Our experience is that audit committees, as committees of the board of 
directors, have virtually unlimited authority to request information from management and 
the auditors. For example, if an audit committee felt it was important to its charter to 
have every audit difference over a dollar reported to it, then it is clearly within its power 
to do so. Promulgating standards which force reporting of information not otherwise 
requested serves purposes other than improving the audit committee function.
Some of the proposals in the ED, such as an annual three-way discussion of the quality of 
the financial reporting, would likely find a consensus as a best practice. Other items may 
not find that consensus. If you view, as we do, that the audit committee’s role is to 
provide oversight of the control framework that leads to quality financial reporting, then 
it should be up to the audit committee to determine the communication with the 
independent auditor best suited for its circumstances. For example, take the case of the 
aforementioned interim financial reporting. If the audit committee is concerned about 
interim misstatements, then it is clearly within their purview to require meetings with the 
auditors prior to public release of information. If the audit committee views the risks as 
low due to their assessment of the control environment, then how docs requiring 
communication possibly meet the cost benefit threshold the ASB claims to apply to 
standard setting.
Our detailed responses on specific issues raised in the ED are discussed below.
Limiting the Scope of the Amendments to Audits of SEC Clients
CCR disagrees with the limitation of this standard to SEC registrant engagements only. 
Foremost, it seems inappropriate to withhold whatever value is created by CPA firms 
through this standard from the boards of client companies that arc not registrants. 
Secondly, it is unclear to us how users, especially non-owners, of audited financial 
statements will be able to discern what an audit opinion stands for if auditing standards 
differ based on who provides capital.
Requiring Discussion of Quality of Accounting Practices with Audit Committee
It is CCR’s position that the marketplace will decide what communications are necessary 
in any specific circumstance, especially when the audit committee has unlimited authority 
to request information. However, we agree that a discussion between management, the 
auditor and the audit committee is a best practice that should be encouraged. We 
especially appreciate that the ASB modified the original BRC proposal to include 
management in such a discussion. We believe that the ASB should define quality and 
explicitly distinguish this communication from a preferability option.
Prohibiting Written Communication
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Prohibiting Written Communication
While CCR definitely feels that written communication should not be mandated, we arc 
curious as to how the effectiveness of audit committees is enhanced by prohibiting 
auditors from responding to a request from audit committees to document their views, 
Distinguishing between a written communication and documentation of an oral 
communication in meeting minutes seems slight at best. Presumably an important 
takeaway from the contemplated discussion is whether the quality of accounting 
decisions change over time. In periods of audit committee member turnover some audit 
committees may deem it desirable to maintain a written record in order make such an 
assessment.
Audit Committee Communication Prior to Release of Interim Financial Information
For the reasons indicated above, CCR strongly opposes making such a communication 
mandatory. While still questioning its necessity given the authority vested in audit 
committees and existing auditing standards on management fraud, CCR would not object 
to the amendment were it changed to require communication only when required 
adjustments to interim financial information were not reflected. We suggest that the ASB 
perform further research as to the likelihood of false positive conclusions from such a 
communication given the limited scope of interim reviews.
* ** *
The CCR committee member that coordinated this response is Stephen F. Reeves of The 
Black & Decker Corporation. Should you have any questions, please contact him at 
(410)716-2118.
Sincerely,
Susan Koski-Grafer   
Vice President - Technical Activities
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December 9, 1999
Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2280 
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Boothe:
We are pleased to comment on the American Institute of Certified Public Accountant’s (AICPA) 
proposed amendments to Statement on Auditing Standard No. 61 (SAS 61), Communication with Audit 
Committees and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71 (SAS 71), Interim Financial Information.
We commend the AICPA and the Blue Ribbon Committee for their efforts to enhance the effectiveness of 
audit committees. Our goals as independent auditors and the goals of audit committees are closely 
aligned - quality financial reporting for the benefit of investors and other stakeholders. We are highly 
supportive of the current audit committee initiatives and believe many of the proposals will result in 
stronger audit committees, benefits to shareholders and an enhanced audit profession.
Generally we support the proposed amendments; specific comments are included in the attachment to this 
letter.
KPMG is committed to enhancing the effectiveness of audit committees and has launched the KPMG 
Audit Committee Institute to help management and directors understand the evolving issues relating to 
corporate governance and the audit committee function. We will be pleased to discuss our comments, if 
you have any questions on these or other matters related to this issue. Please contact Andy Capelli at 
(212) 909-5474.
Very truly yours,
Attachment
Amendment to SAS 61, Communication with Audit Committees.
We concur with the proposed amendment and believe that it addresses the spirit of the Blue Ribbon 
Committee recommendations. We agree that such communication should be oral, and not written, to 
facilitate an open and frank exchange of views between management, the audit committee and the auditor. 
Further, due to the subjectivity of the matter, each auditor needs to clarify that the assessments represent 
their own personal views.
We suggest that the AICPA consider including in the final amendment a modification to paragraph .13 of 
SAS 61. The paragraph currently states: “The auditor should discuss with the audit committee any major 
issues that were discussed with management in connection with initial or recurring retention of the auditor 
including, among other matters, any discussions regarding the application of accounting principles and 
auditing standards.” This implies that management acted on its own to engage the auditors. In light of 
recent proposed exchange rules requiring charters that specify auditor accountability to the audit 
committee, consideration should be given to amending this paragraph to indicate that the audit committee 
or the board of directors, and not management, is responsible for the selection, evaluation and retention or 
replacement of the auditors.
Amendment to SAS 71, Interim Financial Information.
We concur with this proposed amendment. We agree that the results of the interim review procedures 
should drive the form, content and timing of the auditors communications with the audit committee. 
Matters of significance should be brought to the attention of the audit committee prior to the filing of 
Form 10-Q and ideally prior to any earnings release.
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Corning Incorporated 
Corning, New York 14831 
607-974-9000
Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards CORNING
File 2280
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Boothe,
I have reviewed the Exposure Draft of a proposed Statement on Auditing Standards titled
Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61, Communication With Audit
Committees, and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71, Interim Financial Information, and
appreciate the opportunity to present my views. While I support some of the proposed changes, I 
do have reservations about others.
Open and honest communication between management, the audit committee and the auditor is 
undeniably important to the financial reporting process. As such, I support the proposed changes 
to SAS 61 as I believe it will encourage continued open communication between management, 
the audit committee and the auditor. I also believe that this level of communication currently 
exists in most large companies today. Additionally, I agree that it is important that the 
discussion as to the quality, not just the acceptability, of the financial reporting not be in writing. 
Requiring such communication to be done in writing may create boilerplate presentations that 
would not promote open and frank discussions.
Timely and accurate quarterly results are unquestionably important to investors. I do support the 
proposed SEC requirement for a SAS 71 review to be performed quarterly for public companies. 
However, I disagree with the ASB proposal that the auditor should discuss with the audit 
committee the results of such a review prior to the filing of the form 10 Q, or the release of 
financial information to the public. I believe strongly that management is responsible for the 
financial statements and the overall control environment and that the role of the audit committee 
is one of oversight. Management is also responsible for the release of earnings and I believe it is 
the discretion of each audit committee to determine its level of comfort with management’s 
processes. I do not think it is the role of the audit profession to mandate audit committee 
involvement in quarterly financial reporting.
There are also logistical obstacles related to this particular proposal. As companies strive to 
minimize the time between financial closing and public announcement of results, this proposal 
could result in extending this time period. Extending this time and/or sharing financial 
information with outside directors at non-company locations introduces security concerns over 
that information shared.
That said, I emphatically support the idea that the outside auditor should have unrestricted access 
to the audit committee and it’s chairman. In certain situations, the company may desire to 
discuss material transactions or complex accounting issues with the outside auditors. If 
management and the outside auditors do not agree on the accounting treatment for these 
situations, the outside auditor should have free access to the audit committee or the chair of the 
audit committee to discuss such differences of opinion. However, the need and timing of these 
discussions should be at the discretion of management, the audit committee, and the outside 
auditor.
If you would like to discuss any of these comments further, please call me at (607) 974-8242.
Sincerely,
Kathy A. Asbeck
California
Society
Certified
Public
Accountants
December 7, 1999
Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards, File 2280
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Reference: Exposure Draft, Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards
Amendments to Statements on Auditing Standards Nos. 61 & 71
Dear Ms. Boothe:
The Accounting Principles and Auditing Standards Committee of the California 
Society of Certified Public Accountants (AP&AS Committee) has discussed the above 
referenced exposure draft and has comments on it.
The AP&AS Committee is the senior technical committee of our state society. The 
Committee is composed of 39 members, of whom 12 percent are from national CPA 
firms, 53 percent are from local or regional firms, 18 percent are sole practitioners in 
public practice, 8 percent are in industry and 3 percent are in academia.
It is the opinion of the Committee that the statement should not be issued. The 
Committee believes that SAS’s 61 and 71 in their present form provide adequate 
guidance. The Committee also believes that the action expected by the SEC in 
response to the Blue Ribbon Committee’s recommendations further obviates the need 
for the proposed amendment.
Should the Auditing Standards Board feel compelled to issue the proposed 
amendment, the Committee believes that the following points should be addressed:
■ Part 1, paragraph 11 of the draft speaks of the “quality” of an entity’s 
accounting principles. The Committee had trouble defining quality in the 
context of accounting principles and felt that absent further guidance, the 
intended goal of this amendment might not be achieved.
■ Part 1 of the draft also discusses documentation. It is unclear to the AP&AS 
Committee if the auditor is precluded from documenting the full text of their 
discussion with the audit committee. Some AP&AS Committee members felt 
that it was not in the best interest of the practitioner to preclude documentation 
of the topics and recommendations discussed.
Ms. Sherry Boothe 
AICPA
December 7, 1999 
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Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this proposed statement. Please let us know if 
you have any questions or require additional information.
Very truly yours,
Accounting Principles and Auditing
Standards Committee
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
A S C S
CORPORATE SECRETARIES
December 8, 1999
AICPA
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775 
E-mail address: sboothe@aicpa.org 
Attention: Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards
Re: Proposed Amendments to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61, Communication
With Audit Committees, and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 71, Interim 
Financial Information (October 1, 1999)
File 2280
Ladies and Gentlemen:
The Securities Law Committee of the American Society of Corporate Secretaries (the “Society”) is 
pleased to provide comments to the AICPA on its proposed amendments to SAS 61 and SAS 71 
(the “Proposal”). The Society, with more than 4,000 members, represents over 2,700 public 
companies. We believe that our members, who serve as the interface between management, the 
company’s directors and its shareholders, are in a unique position to provide insight and discerning 
perspectives on the issues raised in the Proposal.
The Proposal arises out of the Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on 
Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (“BRC Recommendations”), and 
are part of a three-pronged approach for implementation by the AICPA, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, and stock exchanges.
The Proposal, plus the separate, companion rule proposals of the Commission and the stock 
exchanges, represent an ambitious undertaking to implement the BRC Recommendations. The 
general stated objective to make audit committees more effective is one that the Society and its 
members can support. Our comments are directed to how to best accomplish that objective.
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1. SAS 61 - Communication with Audit Committees.
The proposal would add a requirement that the auditor discuss the following information relating to 
the auditor’s judgments about the “quality,” not just the acceptability, of the company’s 
accounting principles with the audit committee, including matters such as:
a. consistency of application of accounting policies
b. clarity, consistency and completeness of the accounting information 
contained in the financial statements and related disclosures
c. items that have a significant impact on the representational faithfulness, 
verifiability, neutrality, and consistency of the accounting information 
included in the financial statements, including, for example:
i. selection of new or changes to accounting policies
ii. estimates, judgments and uncertainties
iii. unusual transactions
iv. accounting policies relating to significant financial statement items, 
including the timing of transactions and the period in which they are 
recorded
Auditors would be prohibited from communicating in writing the above judgments. The discussion 
would be documented in the audit working papers.
The Society does not oppose specificity about items to be discussed by the auditors with the audit 
committee, provided that the items are related to the application of accounting principles to the 
company’s financial reporting, and have an objective meaning with established standards. For 
example, the Society agrees with discussion about:
• consistency of application of accounting policies
• consistency and completeness of accounting information
• the following items where they have a significant effect on the financial 
statements:
selection of new or changes to accounting policies 
estimates, judgments and uncertainties 
unusual transactions
• accounting policies relating to significant financial statement items, 
including the timing of transactions and the period in which they are 
recorded
The Society, however, strongly opposes the requirement to discuss the “quality” not just the 
acceptability of the company’s accounting principles. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(“GAAP”) is the historically recognized standard for Generally Accepted Auditing Standards and 
financial statement reporting . The Proposal would introduce “quality” and other theoretical 
concepts that were intended to be tools to guide the Financial Accounting Standards Board in
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developing accounting and reporting standards.* The concepts have no established objective 
standards. The AICPA itself recognizes in the Proposal that there are no objective criteria for 
“quality.” In fact, in part because of the lack of criteria, the Proposal prohibits the auditor from 
communicating its judgments about “quality” in writing. In light of this, there can be no valid 
basis to subject companies and their audit committees to a requirement to discuss, and possibly be 
subject to, claims that they are responsible for, non-existent standards for financial statements. 
This aspect of the Proposal, if adopted, can only have the effect of creating potential litigation and 
liability, and discouraging qualified directors from serving on audit committees.
Accordingly, we urge that the words “the auditor’s judgments about the quality, not just the 
acceptability, of” and the terms “clarity,” “representational faithfulness,” and “neutrality” be 
deleted from proposed subsection .11 of SAS 61 (AU sec. 380.11). Finally, if the above changes 
are made, the last three sentences of proposed subsection .11, dealing with the lack of objective 
criteria and the prohibition on written communications, would appear unnecessary and can be 
deleted.
2. SAS 71 - Interim Financial Information.
SAS 71 would be amended to require* the auditors to have the SAS 61 discussions (presently 
required only for annual audits) in connection with a review of interim financials. Specifically,
a. SAS 61 Discussion. The auditor would have to communicate to the audit 
committee, or be satisfied through discussions with the audit committee that 
management communicated to the committee, matters described in SAS 61 that 
have been identified in the conduct of the interim financial review.
We generally support the proposal requiring a discussion of SAS 61 information that has been 
identified related to interim financial statements, but only if the content and extent of the SAS 61 
information does not expand beyond the current Proposal modified in accordance with our 
comments above, including elimination of the requirement to discuss the “quality” of accounting 
principles.
We believe that such discussions can be helpful in ensuring that quarterly financial statements are 
reliable and credible. Interim reviews also can relieve some of the burden and time pressure of the 
year-end audit, as auditors will already be conversant with many of the significant issues expected 
to arise on the year-end audit.
‘ Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information (May 
1980).
* We note that SAS 71 as proposed to be amended appears to require auditor review prior to filing the Form 10-Q 
(or 10-QSR). only if any SAS 61 items are identified. In other words, if the company chooses to have its auditors 
do a SAS 61 review for the interim financial statements as well as the annual financials, then the auditors would 
be required to attempt to have a SAS 71 discussion prior to filing the form 10-Q. However, if the SEC’s 
companion proposals (Release No. 34-41987; October 7, 1999) are adopted as proposed, SEC-reporting 
companies would be required to have the SAS 71 discussion/review prior to filing the Form 10-Q (or 10-QSB).
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Many of our larger corporate members already engage in SAS 61 type discussions with their 
auditors in connection with their interim financial statements. For those companies, the proposed 
SAS 71 requirement for interim SAS 61 discussions should not introduce any significant cost 
increases or other burdens.
In addition, we understand that the major accounting firms are in most cases now requiring such 
reviews as a condition to acceptance of new audit engagements. Thus, for many companies, the 
proposal will not add significantly to the burden and expense of auditor reviews. For those 
companies whose auditors do not now perform SAS 61-type reviews on interim financial 
statements, it should be recognized that the requirement will add additional cost and delays in 
release of interim financial statements.
In trying to devise a proposal that would provide the benefits of interim discussions without unduly 
burdening those companies who presently do not have such a procedure, we believe the best 
approach would be to defer the effectiveness of the proposed amendment to SAS 71 to interim 
periods in fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2001. Earlier application should, of 
course, be permitted and recommended. This would allow one year for the companies to develop 
procedures, schedule audit committee meetings, establish internal review timetables, and make the 
other necessary arrangements to implement the new requirements. In any event, the currently 
proposed effective date would apply to first calendar quarter 2000 interim financial statements for 
calendar year companies, a very tight time period under the best of circumstances. Finally, the 
AICPA should consider an exemption or extended phase-in period for small businesses.
b. Timing of Interim Financial Review Discussions. The auditor would be required to 
attempt to discuss the SAS 61 matters with the audit committee or at least the 
committee chairperson, and a representative of financial management, prior to the 
filing of the Form 10-Q and, if possible, prior to a public announcement of interim 
financial results.
We support the principles that the independent auditor have timely access to the audit committee, or at 
least the chair of the committee, and company financial management to discuss SAS 61 matters 
identified with respect to interim financial statements prior to filing the Form 10-Q or 10-QSB. We 
have some concerns, however, with the proposed amendment to SAS 71, particularly as it applies to 
public announcements of interim results.
With respect to SAS 61 discussions prior to public announcement of results, we believe that some of 
our larger company’s members already have such discussions. The new requirement would not impose 
any significant burden or delay on them. With respect to other companies, the requirement could lead 
to delays in earnings releases which work to the disadvantage of investors and create the conditions 
under which inadvertent leaks may occur. While it is preferable to have the audit committee 
discussions prior to release of earnings, it may not be practicable for some companies for a variety of 
reasons. Among other things, many companies may not have their full financial statements completed 
at the time they announce earnings. The Society proposes that the requirement regarding discussions 
prior to public announcement be modified to be a recommended best practice, and that SAS 61 clarify 
that companies are not required to delay the timing of their earnings releases or take on additional 
burdens in order to have the discussion with the audit committee (or chair) prior to the release of 
earnings.
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The Society appreciates this opportunity to comment on the Proposal. Please let us know if you have 
any questions on our views.
Sincerely,
Margaret M. Foran 
Chair
Securities Law Committee
  -  Michael J. Holiday 
Co-Chair
Corporate Audit Committee Task Force
Corporate Audit Committee Task Force
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Kathleen A. Weigand 
Co-Chair
December 15, 1999
Ms. Sherry Boothe
Audit and Attest Standards
File 2280
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
National
Association
Re: File No. 2280; Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards,
Amendments to SAS Nos. 61 and 71
of
Dear Ms. Boothe:
Real Estate
Investment
The National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT) is pleased 
to have the opportunity to respond to the AlCPA’s proposed Amendments to
Trusts® Statements on Auditing Standards Nos. 61 and 71 (the Proposal). NAREIT is the 
national trade association for REITs and publicly traded real estate companies. 
Members include real estate investment trusts (REITs) and other businesses that 
develop, own, operate, and finance income-producing real estate, as well as those 
firms and individuals who advise, study, and service these businesses.
General Comments
NAREIT agrees with all of those involved in implementing the proposals of the 
Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit 
Committees (the BRC) that a vigilant and informed audit committee is essential to 
ensure both investor protection and investor confidence. The Proposal suggests 
certain amendments to SAS Nos. 61 and 71 in response to the BRC’s 
recommendations and related proposals of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the major stock exchanges. Below are NAREIT’s specific 
comments on the Proposal.
Comments Regarding Proposed Amendments to SAS No. 61
Auditor’s Judgements About the Quality of a Company’s Accounting Principles
The Proposal would require that the auditor discuss with the audit committee the 
auditor’s judgements about the quality, not just the acceptability, of an SEC 
client’s accounting principles. The understandings of certain criteria, which may 
be used in making these judgements, are relatively simple and clear. These 
include consistency, clarity, completeness and verifiability. Other criteria such as 
neutrality and representational faithfulness may not be clearly understood by 
auditors, management or audit committee members. This represents a radical 
change from previous practice.
♦ ♦ ♦
1875 Eye Street, NV. Suite 600, Washington, DC 20006-5413
Phone 202-739-9400 Fax 202-739-9401 www.nareit.com
Ms. Sherry Boothe 
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For over fifty years, accounting professionals, including both financial managers and auditors, 
have generally operated under the notion that accounting principles used by a company are 
acceptable if they are consistent with Generally Accepted Accounting Principle (GAAP). In 
addition, many believe that the U.S. capital markets are the most efficient in the world, in large 
part because of the quality of U.S. financial reporting. We are concerned that, until a common 
framework for assessing reporting quality is established by standard setters, conversations 
between auditors and audit committees about the quality of acceptable accounting principles may 
be confusing and dysfunctional.
Therefore, we urge the AICPA to delay the requirement for auditors to communicate their 
judgements about the quality of a company’s accounting principles until a common framework 
for assessing this quality is established and understood by management, auditors and audit 
committee members. If this requirement for the auditor to discuss a client’s accounting 
principles is included in a final standard, we would suggest that it only require the auditor to 
discuss alternative accounting treatments in a neutral manner—not assessing the relative quality 
of alternative principles.
Prohibition Against Written Auditor/Audit Committee Communication
The proposal prohibits auditors from communicating in writing the auditor’s judgements about 
the quality of a company’s accounting principles. We believe that it is appropriate to base 
conversations between auditors and audit committees on written communications.
Therefore, we suggest that the amendment to SAS No. 61 prohibit the use of “solely” written 
communications. It should require discussions between auditors and audit committees “in 
addition to” any written communications.
Comments Regarding Proposed Amendments to SAS No. 71
Although we support an SEC requirement that registrants engage their outside auditors to 
conduct a SAS 71 review of interim financial information prior to the company’s filing of its 
quarterly Form 10-Q, we do not support the Proposal’s requirement that the accountant of an 
SEC client “attempt” to discuss with the audit committee the matters described in SAS No. 61 
prior to filing or announcing interim information. Because of the time pressures involved with 
quarterly reporting, we believe that this “attempt,” or even a phone conversation between 
management, auditors and the audit committee chair, will devolve into a superficial review and 
discussion. Worse, we are concerned that this superficial process will become a substitute for a 
more substantive conversation between the auditor and the full audit committee regarding 
interim financial reports. In addition, we are concerned about a standard containing the 
vagueness of a notion of an auditor attempting to have discussions with audit committees.
Accordingly, we urge the AICPA to eliminate from its Proposal the requirement that an auditor 
of an SEC client “attempt” to have discussions with the audit committee prior to the filing or 
otherwise releasing interim financial information. We recommend that the standard require that 
the auditor communicate appropriate findings from their SAS 61 review with the full audit 
committee at its next subsequent meeting.
♦ ♦ ♦
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Conclusion
NAREIT fully supports the efforts of all parties to enhance the effectiveness of corporate audit 
committees and thanks the AICPA for the opportunity to comment on its proposed amendments 
to SAS Nos. 61 and 71. Please contact me at (484) 530-1888 or George Yungmann, NAREIT’s 
Senior Advisor, Financial Standards, at (202) 739-9432 if you have any questions regarding this 
letter.
Sincerely,
Timothy A. Peterson
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, Keystone Property Trust 
Co-Chair, NAREIT Accounting Committee
♦ ♦ ♦
National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts*
Meritor Automotive, Inc. 
2135 West Maple Road 
Troy, MI 48084-7186
MERITOR
November 24, 1999
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary
U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
450 Fifth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20549-0609
Re: Proposed Rule Changes - Audit Committees
File No. SR-NYSE-99-39 and File No. S7-22-99
Dear Mr. Katz:
Meritor Automotive, Inc. (“Meritor”) submits the following comments in the files 
referenced above. Meritor’s Common Stock, $1 par value, is listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange and registered under Section 12(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), and Meritor files periodic reports and proxy 
statements pursuant to Sections 13 and 14 of the Exchange Act.
File No. SR-NYSE-99-39 - Proposed Rule Change Amending Audit Committee
Requirements of Listed Companies
In response to recommendations issued in February 1999 by the Blue Ribbon Committee 
on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (the “Blue Ribbon 
Committee”), The New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (the “Exchange”) has proposed an 
amendment to Section 303 of its Listed Company Manual. Section 303 contains audit 
committee requirements applicable to companies with securities listed on the Exchange, 
including Meritor. The amendment, in general terms, would require each audit 
committee to have a written charter containing specified provisions; each audit 
committee member to be independent, as defined, and financially literate; and at least one 
audit committee member to have financial or accounting expertise.
Meritor supports the purposes and goals of the Blue Ribbon Committee’s
recommendations and the Exchange’s proposed amendment. We agree that standards 
and guidelines for audit committees help to promote quality financial reporting and 
constitute an essential part of good corporate governance. In particular, we believe that
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requirements with respect to independence and financial knowledge of audit committee 
members are necessary and entirely appropriate. Meritor’s board of directors gave 
substantial weight to these attributes in selecting the current members of its audit 
committee.
However, we believe that one of the Exchange’s proposals (which corresponds with Blue 
Ribbon Committee recommendation number 7) may be interpreted to impose additional 
obligations and potential liabilities on audit committees. Meritor is concerned with the 
proposed requirement that the audit committee’s written charter specify that the audit 
committee is responsible for “ensuring” the independence of the company’s auditors. On 
this subject, we concur with the position stated by Deloitte & Touche LLP, Meritor’s 
independent auditor, in its comment letter submitted in this file on November 3, 1999.
We agree that the audit committee should review any relationships and transactions 
between the company and its auditors that may affect their independence. The audit 
committee should also be responsible for obtaining an independence letter from the 
company’s auditors, in accordance with ISB Standard No. 1. However, in our view, the 
burden of ensuring independence should fall on the auditors themselves and should not 
be transferred to any other party in the audit process. We believe that the committee 
should be entitled to reasonably rely on the representations and disclosures made by the 
company’s auditors as to their independence, and should not be compelled to ensure that 
those representations and disclosures are correct. We respectfully request that the final 
wording of Section 303 of the Listed Company Manual be modified accordingly to 
clarify that the audit committee’s role is to monitor or oversee the independence of the 
outside auditor.
File No. S7-22-99 - Proposed Rule on Audit Committee Disclosure
In response to the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) also issued rule proposals that would require 
certain disclosures on the functioning of audit committees of Exchange Act reporting 
companies, including Meritor. The stated purpose of the proposed rules would be “to 
promote investor confidence in the integrity of the financial reporting process . . . ,” 
among other things. Again, Meritor supports the Commission’s efforts in improving 
disclosure in this area. However, we also have concerns with certain specific provisions 
of the proposed rules.
1. Negative Assurance - Blue Ribbon Committee Recommendation No. 9. The proposed 
rules would require that a company’s proxy statement include a report of the audit 
committee containing specified elements. Among other things the report would be 
required to include a statement by the audit committee whether, based on its review 
of the financial statements and discussions with management and the independent 
auditors, anything has come to the committee’s attention that has caused it to believe 
that the audited financial statements contain an untrue statement of material fact or 
omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
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circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. The release proposing 
the rule amendments also suggested various alternative forms of assurance and 
requested comment on these alternatives.
The Commission noted in the proposing release that “[e]ffective oversight of the 
financial reporting process is fundamental to preserving the integrity of our markets. 
Audit committees can, and should, be the corporate participant best able to perform 
that oversight function.” Similarly, the Blue Ribbon Committee recognized that the 
audit committee’s role is “clearly one of oversight and monitoring.”
We agree that the audit committee’s role is to oversee and monitor the integrity of the 
financial reporting process. We also believe that requiring the proposed assurances, 
in any form, would expand the scope of the audit committee’s responsibilities beyond 
the boundaries of oversight, and would require the committee to give “comfort” on 
the substance of the financial statements. This role, we believe, is better left to the 
accountants. Further, any such requirement could be a significant disincentive to 
audit committee service, as a result of the potential for increased liability as well as 
the increased workload. Accordingly, we respectfully suggest that this aspect of the 
proposed rules not be adopted, in any form.
2. Location of Information with respect to the Audit Committee - Blue Ribbon 
Committee Recommendation No. 5. The Commission proposed that specific 
information with respect to the audit committee be included in any proxy statement 
relating to the election of directors and is seeking comments as to whether this would 
be the appropriate place for the disclosure in question. We believe that it would be 
more meaningful to include this information in proximity to the company’s audited 
financial statements. As a result, we respectfully suggest that the required disclosure 
be contained in the company’s Form 10-K or, alternatively, incorporated into the 
Form 10-K from the Annual Report to Shareholders.
The proposed rules would also require that a company include a copy of the audit 
committee charter as an appendix to the proxy statement at least once every three 
years. We believe that this proposal, if adopted, would increase printing and mailing 
costs in an amount that may be disproportionate to the level of investor interest, while 
at the same time failing to provide interested investors with current information. We 
respectfully suggest that the audit committee charter instead be filed as an exhibit to 
the Form 10-K each year, with any interim amendment being filed as an exhibit to the 
next Form 10-Q. In this manner, the audit committee charter would be readily 
available to interested parties on the SEC’s website, or upon request to the company, 
on a more current basis than that in the proposed rule, but at less expense to the 
company. Alternatively, if the Commission ultimately determines that proxy 
statement presentation is required, Meritor respectfully suggests that a summary of 
the charter be included rather than appending the charter in its entirety.
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Meritor appreciates the opportunity to express its views on the proposed rules of the 
Exchange and the Commission. If you have any questions with respect the foregoing, 
you can contact the undersigned at 248/435-5504 or, in my absence, Vernon G. Baker, II, 
at 248/435-0786, David W. Greenfield at 248/435-7708 or Bonnie Wilkinson at 
248/435-0762.
Sincerely,
MERITOR AUTOMOTIVE, INC.
By: 
Thomas A. Madden 
Senior Vice President 
And Chief Financial Officer
cc: The New York Stock Exchange, Inc.
Attention: Richard A Grasso, Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer
Auditing Standards Board 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
Attention: Deborah D. Lambert, Chair
Ira M. Millstein, Co-Chairman of the Blue Ribbon Committee 
John C. Whitehead, Co-Chairman of the Blue Ribbon Committee
Meritor Automotive, Inc. 
2135 West Maple Road 
Troy, MI 48084-7186
MERITOR
November 26, 1999
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary
U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
450 Fifth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20549-0609
Re: Proposed Rule Changes - Audit Committees
File No. SR-NYSE-99-39 and File No. S7-22-99
Dear Mr. Katz:
The Audit Committee of Meritor Automotive, Inc. (“Meritor”) submits the following 
comments in the files referenced above. Meritor’s Common Stock, $1 par value, is listed 
on the New York Stock Exchange and registered under Section 12(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), and Meritor files periodic 
reports and proxy statements pursuant to Sections 13 and 14 of the Exchange Act.
File No. SR-NYSE-99-39 - Proposed Rule Change Amending Audit Committee
Requirements of Listed Companies
In response to recommendations issued in February 1999 by the Blue Ribbon Committee 
on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (the “Blue Ribbon 
Committee”), The New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (the “Exchange”) has proposed an 
amendment to Section 303 of its Listed Company Manual. Section 303 contains audit 
committee requirements applicable to companies with securities listed on the Exchange, 
including Meritor. The amendment, in general terms, would require each audit 
committee to have a written charter containing specified provisions; each audit 
committee member to be independent, as defined, and financially literate; and at least one 
audit committee member to have financial or accounting expertise.
Meritor’s Audit Committee supports the purposes and goals of the Blue Ribbon 
Committee’s recommendations and the Exchange’s proposed amendment. We agree that 
standards and guidelines for audit committees help to promote quality financial reporting 
and constitute an essential part of good corporate governance. In particular, we believe 
that requirements with respect to independence and financial knowledge of audit
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committee members are necessary and entirely appropriate. Meritor’s Board of Directors 
gave substantial weight to these attributes in selecting the current members of Meritor’s 
Audit Committee.
However, we believe that one of the Exchange’s proposals (which corresponds with Blue 
Ribbon Committee recommendation number 7) may be interpreted to impose additional 
obligations and potential liabilities on audit committees. We are concerned with the 
proposed requirement that the audit committee’s written charter specify that the audit 
committee is responsible for “ensuring” the independence of the company’s auditors. On 
this subject, we concur with the position stated by Deloitte & Touche LLP, Meritor’s 
independent auditor, in its comment letter submitted in this file on November 3, 1999.
We agree that an audit committee should make inquiry regarding and review any 
relationships and transactions between the company and its auditors that may affect their 
independence. The audit committee should also be responsible for obtaining an 
independence letter from the company’s auditors, in accordance with ISB Standard No. 1. 
However, in our view, the burden of ensuring independence should fall on the auditors 
themselves and should not be transferred to any other party in the audit process. We 
believe that an audit committee should reasonably be entitled to rely on the 
representations and disclosures made by the company’s auditors as to their independence, 
and should not be compelled to ensure that those representations and disclosures are 
correct. Taken to the extreme that litigious plaintiffs’ bar is readily capable of, this 
requirement, if retained, could in effect cause audit committees to have to retain outside 
experts to make an appropriate investigation and advise the committee as to whether the 
independent auditors are in fact independent. We can readily see an entire new specialty 
being created, at substantial and unnecessary expense, were this requirement to be 
retained. We respectfully request that the final wording of Section 303 of the Listed 
Company Manual be modified accordingly to clarify that the audit committee’s role is to 
monitor or oversee the independence of the outside auditor.
File No. S7-22-99 - Proposed Rule on Audit Committee Disclosure
In response to the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) also issued rule proposals that would require 
certain disclosures on the functioning of audit committees of Exchange Act reporting 
companies, including Meritor. The stated purpose of the proposed rules would be “to 
promote investor confidence in the integrity of the financial reporting process ...,” 
among other things. Again, Meritor’s Audit Committee supports the Commission’s 
efforts in improving disclosure in this area. However, we also have concerns with 
certain specific provisions of the proposed rules.
1. Negative Assurance - Blue Ribbon Committee Recommendation No. 9. The proposed 
rules would require that a company’s proxy statement include a report of the audit 
committee containing specified elements. Among other things the report would be 
required to include a statement by the audit committee whether, based on its review
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of the financial statements and discussions with management and the independent 
auditors, anything has come to the committee’s attention that has caused it to believe 
that the audited financial statements contain an untrue statement of material fact or 
omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. The release proposing 
the rule amendments also suggested various alternative forms of assurance and 
requested comment on these alternatives.
The Commission noted in the proposing release that “[ejffective oversight of the 
financial reporting process is fundamental to preserving the integrity of our markets. 
Audit committees can, and should, be the corporate participant best able to perform 
that oversight function.” Similarly, the Blue Ribbon Committee recognized that the 
audit committee’s role is “clearly one of oversight and monitoring.”
We agree that an audit committee’s role is to oversee and monitor the integrity of the 
financial reporting process. We also believe that requiring the proposed assurances, 
in any form, would expand the scope of the audit committee’s responsibilities beyond 
the boundaries of oversight, and would require the committee to give “comfort” on 
the substance of the financial statements. This role, we believe, is better left to the 
accountants. Further, any such requirement could be a significant disincentive to 
audit committee service, as a result of the potential for increased liability as well as 
the increased workload. Again, we are mindful of the plaintiffs’ bar’s penchant for 
frivolous litigation and see no substantive difference whether positive or negative 
assurance be provided by the audit committee. A committee conscientious in 
performing its duties would, were this requirement to be retained, have to consider 
again retaining other accounting experts to help it review the work of the independent 
auditors to see whether the committee responsibly could reasonably provide negative 
(or positive) assurance. Accordingly, we respectfully suggest that this aspect of the 
proposed rules not be adopted, in any form.
2. Location of Information with respect to the Audit Committee - Blue Ribbon 
Committee Recommendation No. 5. The Commission proposed that specific 
information with respect to the audit committee be included in any proxy statement 
relating to the election of directors and is seeking comments as to whether this would 
be the appropriate place for the disclosure in question. We believe that it would be 
more meaningful to include this information in proximity to the company’s audited 
financial statements. As a result, we respectfully suggest that the required disclosure 
be contained in the company’s Form 10-K or, alternatively, incorporated into the 
Form 10-K from the Annual Report to Shareholders.
The proposed rules would also require that a company include a copy of the audit 
committee charter as an appendix to the proxy statement at least once every three 
years. We believe that this proposal, if adopted, would not only increase printing and 
mailing costs in an amount that may be disproportionate to the level of investor 
interest, while at the same time failing to provide interested investors with current
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information, but also, and more importantly, would continue the ever increasing 
amount of information required to be included in proxy statements, with the 
unfortunate yet foreseeable result that fewer and fewer investors find the information 
sufficiently useful to read proxy statements. We respectfully suggest that the audit 
committee charter instead be filed as an exhibit to the Form 10-K each year, with any 
interim amendment being filed as an exhibit to the next Form 10-Q. In this manner, 
the audit committee charter would be readily available to interested parties on the 
SEC’s website, or upon request to the company, on a more current basis than that in 
the proposed rule, but at less expense to the company. Alternatively, if the 
Commission ultimately determines that proxy statement presentation is required, 
Meritor’s Audit Committee respectfully suggests that a summary of the charter be 
included rather than appending the charter in its entirety.
We appreciate the opportunity to express our views on the proposed rules of the 
Exchange and the Commission. If you have any questions with respect the foregoing, 
you can contact the undersigned at 412/565-2059.
Sincerely,
MERITOR AUTOMOTIVE, INC.
AUDIT COMMITTEE
an
cc: The New York Stock Exchange, Inc.
Attention: Richard A Grasso, Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer
Auditing Standards Board
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
Attention: Deborah D. Lambert, Chair
Ira M. Millstein, Co-Chairman of the Blue Ribbon Committee 
John C. Whitehead, Co-Chairman of the Blue Ribbon Committee
#3 
Richard E. Staedtler 
33 North Braintree Common 
Langhorne, PA 19053
October 4, 1999
Mr. Ira Millstein
Senior Partner
c/o Paula Lowitt, Esq.
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
767 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10153-0119
Re: Audit Committee Issues
Dear Mr. Millstein:
I am the chief financial officer of Castle Energy Corporation (Nasdaq:CECX), a small public 
company engaged in the business of exploration and production of oil and gas. I recently reviewed 
the suggestions made by the Blue Ribbon Committee - especially those affecting the timely filing 
of quarterly reports. Attached is a realistic comparison of the review requirements to file a Form 
10-Q a year ago and those currently being proposed. The net effect of the proposed requirements 
is that it will be virtually impossible to file on a timely basis because of the additional procedures 
being contemplated. Even if all review procedures are completed as planned at least 51 days will 
probably be required to file 10-Q, given the added review requirements. The inevitable result will 
be that chief financial officers and controllers have to close the books based on estimates in order 
to allow sufficient time for the multiple reviews being proposed. More reporting companies will 
probably extend filing five days. The probability of mistakes resulting from using estimates or from 
the time pressure caused by these new requirements is, in my opinion, greater than the probability 
that the proposed multiple reviews will uncover mistakes.
In short, I urge you to reconsider your proposals. While some of these proposals appear 
meritorious per se, it will become virtually impossible to meet the additional review requirements 
being imposed and still to file on a timely basis. The combined burden resulting from not only all 
of the Blue Ribbon Committee’s recommendations but also other already existing burdens must be 
considered rather than simply evaluating each recommendation alone.
As I reviewed the list of Blue Ribbon Committee members, I noticed that all members except 
perhaps one were not financial officers who prepare quarterly statements. My guess is that none of 
the committee members has been subject to the same requirements they seek to impose on others. 
I hope this is an oversight and that the Blue Ribbon Committee will include several chief financial 
officers or controllers who currently prepare financials and must work under the increasingly 
stressful and unrealistic review requirements imposed on them.
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I also noticed that the Blue Ribbon Committee members included two senior executives of 
large accounting firms. While I do not question their expertise in determining how long the firms 
require to review and clear a Form 10-Q, I question their knowledge of the procedures and time 
needed to compile and draft Form 10-Q. Auditors audit or review financial statements - they do not 
and most have never prepared them. In addition, auditors benefit significantly from the new 
procedures since additional fees will be charged for quarterly reviews. As a result, auditors have a 
conflict of interest concerning many of the proposed recommendations. The argument that the 
increased quarterly fees will be offset by a corresponding decreased annual fee is specious; whereas 
some of the less costly audit procedures (procedural tests, tests of recorded balances, etc.) may be 
reduced at year end, the costly parts of the review and audit - partner review, second partner review, 
tax review, legal letters, management letters, checklists, etc. are repeated four times instead of once. 
Expectation of no fee increase under such a scenario is quixotic at best.
While I do not dispute the Blue Ribbon Commission’s attempt to strengthen review procedures 
for quarterly filings, I do believe that the proposed procedures, if implemented, would cause more 
mistakes than they discover. While such procedures may be followed in filing Form 10-K within 
90 days they cannot practically be followed in filing Form 10-Q within 45 days. One of the 
justifications for the new proposed procedures is that such procedures will lessen the frequency of 
amending quarterly earnings. I have no problem with the concept. The problem is that the good are 
punished with the evil. Many justifying examples cited were audit failures - not failures to review. 
Companies that have not restated quarterly earnings for the last five years should not be subjected 
to mandatory quarterly review procedures.
I look forward to your response.
Sincerely yours,
RES/sp
cc: Arthur Levitt, Chairman
Securities and Exchange Commission 
450 5th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20549
Richard A. Grasso 
Chairman & CEO
New York Stock Exchange
Eleven Wall Street
New York, New York 10005
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Lynn E. Turner
Chief Accountant
Office of the Chief Accountant 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
450 5th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20549
Robert Bayless
Chief Accountant
Division of Corporate Finance 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
450 5th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20549
Financial Accounting Standards Board 
401 Merritt 7 
P.O. Box 5116 
Norwalk, CT 06856-5116
American Institute of Certified Public 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036-8775 
Attn: Audit Committee Relationship
Public Oversight Board
One Station Place
Stamford, CT 06902
Accountants
Frank G. Zarb
Chairman & CEO
NASDAQ
1735 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006-1500
Blue Ribbon Committee on Audit 
Committees
The Center for Board Leadership 
1215 17th Street, NW, Suite 402 
Washington, D.C. 20036
The Honorable Arlen Specter 
711 Hart Building 
Washington, DC 20510
The Honorable Rick Santorum 
120 Russell Building 
Washington, DC 20510
Joseph L. Castle II 
Mary A. Cade 
John P. Keller 
Martin R. Hoffmann 
Thomas G. Spencer, Esq. 
Sidney F. Wentz 
Robert S. Winter, Jr.
Comparison of Current and Proposed 
Review Requirements
_Days Required After_ 
End of Each quarter
A Year
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12.
(1)
Ago Proposed
Obtain production information to close books (1) 34 34
Consolidate financials 2 2
Draft 10-Q (2) 2 2
Audit schedules (3) 2
Simultaneous review by management, legal counsel and
auditors (2) 3
Separate reviews:
Management and legal counsel 3
Auditors - first partner (4) 4
Auditors - second partner (5) 1
Audit Committee review (6)
Audit Committee and auditor review (6) 2
Edgarization  1  1
Total used 42 51
Extra (deficient) days  3 (6)
Total to file 45 45
Most of Castle’s oil and gas well interests are non-operated. As a result, Castle is dependent 
on timely production and revenue/expense data received from operators. Most of these data 
are received 30-34 days after the month of production. Most operators, many of whom are not 
public companies, are not required to provide the needed information for 30-34 days. Most 
will not provide it sooner because they are also trying to run their monthly revenue and joint 
interest billings. Hiring several people to call operators to obtain needed production 
information 3-4 days earlier would probably fail because the operators are also busy preparing 
their quarterly reports and would often not be able to respond and because there is no 
obligation to do so. Furthermore, attempting to estimate non-operated data only 3-4 days 
before such data are available makes no sense and because there is no obligation to do so.
As a result, one of the major effects of the proposed new requirements is that the financial 
statements become estimates (since we cannot wait another 4-5 days, if we expect to file 
timely).
Form 10-Q disclosure requirements have also increased significantly recently. Market risk, 
Y2K, and prospective accounting principles disclosures have added at least 10% more work 
to Form 10-Q.
(2)
Previously, management, legal counsel, and the auditors all reviewed a single draft 
simultaneously. Because of the proposed proliferation of reviewers and the increased 
probability of minor changes, each proposed reviewer, especially the auditors, will want the 
final copy to review, i.e., they will want a draft reflecting the comments of all the other 
reviewers. The resulting sequential reviews will literally involve most of my time for 6-10 
days as each reviewer reviews not only the original draft 10-Q but also the other reviewers’ 
comments thereto. Furthermore, most reviewers have other jobs. Often they will not be 
available on the earliest day I can get them a draft 10-Q or on the day that another reviewer 
completes his review. The possibility of schedule conflicts becomes greater as more and more 
reviewers are mandated. For example, the probability of having management, legal counsel 
and a single partner from the audit firm available is much greater than the probability of having 
management, the Audit Committee, legal counsel, and two partners (engagement partner and 
second partner) from the audit firm available. The audit partners are typically involved in 
multiple Form 10-Q reviews at quarter end - not just that of my company.
(3) If an SAS #71 review is required, it will take at least two days to prepare the schedules 
(rollforwards, analytical review, etc.) required by the auditors. Additional efforts will also be 
needed to prepare legal letters and management representation letters for the auditors and to 
follow up to make sure the legal letters are returned in 5-6 days - a period much shorter than 
that demanded by most legal firms. If there is new litigation, a much longer response could 
be required.
(4) The audit review does not consist of one partner reviewing the 10-Q and related schedules. 
Audit firms were hierarchical when I was at Price Waterhouse and they appear to remain so 
today. Currently a staff or senior will typically foot and vouch schedules, a manager will 
review the staff or senior’s work and conduct the review of more difficult areas and a partner 
will review the draft 10-Q and related workpapers. If any accounting issues arise, second 
partners, industry partners and national office partners may be consulted. If further explanation 
or work is need, such tasks will typically be delegated - often down to the lowest private in the 
chain of command. In short, all or most of the full chain of command is often used to conduct 
the review. In addition, tax partners are often called upon to review tax implications. The net 
result is that it is virtually impossible to accomplish a timely review when the complete chain 
of command from private to general is involved despite the best of intentions. The SAS #71 
review requirements being contemplated by the SEC will result in the mobilization of the 
complete auditing chain of command when there is not sufficient time for such complete chain 
of command. Delays will be inevitable given the number of auditors now involved in the 
review and the related probability that each reviewer’s time schedule cannot be changed to 
accommodate the 10-Q review procedures of any single company. Review will involve much 
more than simply the review of a draft 10-Q by one firm partner or manager.
(5) I believe most if not all auditors now require second partner reviews for Form 10-Q. This 
often requires 1-2 more days as the second partner, often new to the account, frequently asks 
historical questions requiring much background work. Often this involves review of 
transactions and related accounting issues that occurred years ago. While there may be 
sufficient time for such dual review at year end there is simply not sufficient time during the 
clearance of quarterly financials.
(6) The Blue Ribbon Panel proposes that the auditor discuss each quarterly report with the Audit 
Committee or the Chairman thereof and management. This is also time consuming because 
a) it is unlikely that the Audit Committee can all meet when the auditors are ready and b) the 
auditors and Audit Committee live far apart and are often unavailable due to other job 
requirements. In addition, the Blue Ribbon Committee recommends that the Audit Committee 
state whether it believes the financial statements are in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles and expects the Audit Committee to be able to discuss the financial 
statements on a level approaching that of the auditors. This requirement is naive. If the Audit 
Committee wants to achieve this level of proficiency it will have to review the financial 
statements and schedules to at least the same degree as the auditors. This would require days. 
Many Audit Committee members do not want to conduct such a level of review nor should 
they be required to do so if the auditors have done so. The Audit Committee’s main functions 
do not include determination of generally accepted accounting principles and application 
thereof. They assign this task to the experts - the auditors! The Audit Committee’s function 
is to make sure a competent review is undertaken - not to conduct the review themselves. If 
these recommendations are instituted, the result could be that the Audit Committee hires 
additional auditors to determine for it whether generally accepted accounting principles have 
been followed.
